APN Issue no. 74 - January 28, 1986
AIDA PARKER was one of South Africa’s best-known political and investigative journalists. She was, until the end of 1982, contributing editor of The Citizen, the daily newspaper she helped launch in 1976. Before that, she was chief political writer on The Financial Gazette, following years of experience with the Argus group, publishers of The Star. In April 1985 she launched The Aida Parker Newsletter (APN) which was distributed on a subscription list around South Africa and the world. Aida suffered a stroke in August 2002 and died on 21 February 2003, at the age of 84.
NOTE:
The text on this page was sourced, word-for-word, from a scanned copy of The Aida Parker Newsletter, Issue No. 74, dated January 28, 1986.
The text on this page was sourced, word-for-word, from a scanned copy of The Aida Parker Newsletter, Issue No. 74, dated January 28, 1986.
January 28, 1986
THEY are the bravest of the brave: but in the silent, lonely and ruthless world of espionage and counter-espionage, no monuments mark their splendid, invariably unsung, victories. Which, surely, is sad ingratitude: because it is the cloak-without-dagger brigade, the “clandestine-and-covert” agents, with their feats of daring, courage and intelligence, who very often form a threatened nation’s foremost arm of defence.
In this issue, APN takes the unusual step of paying tribute to SA’s greatest living agent: a man who last month perplexed millions of South Africans by resigning from the Security Police. His explanation? That he had wearied of a bureaucratic system with slow career advancement. Probably more accurately: because he prefers action to paper work.
He is, of course, Major Craig Williamson, the deep-cover operative who six years ago set off shock waves around the world by emerging from the shadows, having spent 37 months in the immaculate Swiss city of Geneva, serving as Pretoria’s eyes on a major Western front organisation cooperating with a wide range of revolutionary groups, all dedicated to SA’s violent overthrow.
He is, of course, Major Craig Williamson, the deep-cover operative who six years ago set off shock waves around the world by emerging from the shadows, having spent 37 months in the immaculate Swiss city of Geneva, serving as Pretoria’s eyes on a major Western front organisation cooperating with a wide range of revolutionary groups, all dedicated to SA’s violent overthrow.
Crisis
At this time of immense crisis in SA, it is perhaps salutary to remind our dangerously naïve countrymen about the formidable network of forces, financed by both East and West, working against us. His target? The Swedish-funded International University Exchange Fund (IUEF), ostensibly an “international humanitarian organisation” charged with providing scholarships to SA and other “refugees.” Real purpose? 1. To prepare young revolutionaries for “political mobilisation,” and 2. To generate “skilled manpower” in readiness for the administrative takeover after “liberation.”
IUEF’s main SA beneficiaries? These included Steve Biko’s Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), NUSAS, Bishop Tutu and the SA Council of Churches. In June 1978 IUEF’s honeymoon with BCM having chilled, it issued a “formal recognition” of the ANC: but this only after it had beavered away trying to help Biko woo Bishop Tutu into becoming the BCM figurehead. IUEF playing its role by “keeping the Bishop sweet” by advancing funds “as he needed them.” Established in Leiden, Holland, in November 1961, IUEF was born out of the old International Student Conference (ISC). ISC’s political aims were clearly spelt out in its official mouthpiece, The Student, in the January/February issue of 1967:
IUEF’s main SA beneficiaries? These included Steve Biko’s Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), NUSAS, Bishop Tutu and the SA Council of Churches. In June 1978 IUEF’s honeymoon with BCM having chilled, it issued a “formal recognition” of the ANC: but this only after it had beavered away trying to help Biko woo Bishop Tutu into becoming the BCM figurehead. IUEF playing its role by “keeping the Bishop sweet” by advancing funds “as he needed them.” Established in Leiden, Holland, in November 1961, IUEF was born out of the old International Student Conference (ISC). ISC’s political aims were clearly spelt out in its official mouthpiece, The Student, in the January/February issue of 1967:
“The goal upon which the IUEF work is focussed … the liberation of those African nations still suffering under the rule of colonialism or apartheid. There IUEF stays in close contact with all the major liberation movements and receives scholarship nominations from them.” Movements listed included ANC, PAC, Swapo, Zanu, Zapu and Frelimo.
Shady
In 1967 came disclosure of ISC’s shady origins: that the CIA was largely responsible for its creation, was still its main financial prop. After this expose, ISC was allowed to die, but IUEF was kept going as an “independent” organisation. IUEF developed amazingly fast from a small fund providing a limited number of scholarships to one of the most important organisations in its field. By the end of the 1970’s the total number of IUEF scholarships covered more than 2000 African and almost 600 Latin American “refugees.”
From its inception IUEF had been heavily involved in the anti-SA thrust. One of its very first scholarships holders was PAC leader, Barney Desai. However, because of its Western base and because it was not visibly supporting illegal anti-SA activities, Pretoria’s security services did not, at that stage, focus serious attention on it. However, by the early 1970s it was increasingly clear that not only was the IUEF rapidly escalating its support for anti-SA action, but that it regarded armed struggle and violence as the preferred method of creating “political change” in SA.
From its inception IUEF had been heavily involved in the anti-SA thrust. One of its very first scholarships holders was PAC leader, Barney Desai. However, because of its Western base and because it was not visibly supporting illegal anti-SA activities, Pretoria’s security services did not, at that stage, focus serious attention on it. However, by the early 1970s it was increasingly clear that not only was the IUEF rapidly escalating its support for anti-SA action, but that it regarded armed struggle and violence as the preferred method of creating “political change” in SA.
Aims
In 1967 came disclosure of ISC’s shady origins: that the CIA was largely responsible for its creation, was still its main financial prop. After this expose, ISC was allowed to die, but IUEF was kept going as an “independent” organisation. IUEF developed amazingly fast from a small fund providing a limited number of scholarships to one of the most important organisations in its field. By the end of the 1970’s the total number of IUEF scholarships covered more than 2000 African and almost 600 Latin American “refugees.”
From its inception IUEF had been heavily involved in the anti-SA thrust. One of its very first scholarships holders was PAC leader, Barney Desai. However, because of its Western base and because it was not visibly supporting illegal anti-SA activities, Pretoria’s security services did not, at that stage, focus serious attention on it. However, by the early 1970s it was increasingly clear that not only was the IUEF rapidly escalating its support for anti-SA action, but that it regarded armed struggle and violence as the preferred method of creating “political change” in SA.
Again, IUEF’s aims were spelt out in the clearest possible terms by its Swedish director, Lars-Gunnar Eriksson, at an “International Conference of Experts for the Support of Victims of Colonialism and Apartheid in Southern Africa,” held in Oslo, April, 1973. Here for the first time Eriksson spoke of giving assistance to those “behind the enemy lines.” Under the heading, “The Motives behind Assistance,” he said:
From its inception IUEF had been heavily involved in the anti-SA thrust. One of its very first scholarships holders was PAC leader, Barney Desai. However, because of its Western base and because it was not visibly supporting illegal anti-SA activities, Pretoria’s security services did not, at that stage, focus serious attention on it. However, by the early 1970s it was increasingly clear that not only was the IUEF rapidly escalating its support for anti-SA action, but that it regarded armed struggle and violence as the preferred method of creating “political change” in SA.
Again, IUEF’s aims were spelt out in the clearest possible terms by its Swedish director, Lars-Gunnar Eriksson, at an “International Conference of Experts for the Support of Victims of Colonialism and Apartheid in Southern Africa,” held in Oslo, April, 1973. Here for the first time Eriksson spoke of giving assistance to those “behind the enemy lines.” Under the heading, “The Motives behind Assistance,” he said:
“… the time has come when organisations must recognise that the prime intention is to provide, with unavoidable limitations, assistance towards the ultimate and total liberation of the countries in southern Africa and to plan programmes and priorities in that context.” Under the heading, “Programmes Behind Enemy Lines,” this armchair general added: “It is today, by and large, recognised that liberation and revolution must come within the country.” He added that many of those who had graduated on IUEF scholarships “are now working for the liberation of their own people.”
By 1979 IUEF was providing millions of rand annually to anti-SA terrorist groups, to political activists inside SA and abroad and to various other projects. Main recipient of such hand-outs was the ANC: to be expected of any Soviet front organisation, supported by Social Democrats and religious groups. Around 85 per cent of the IUEF funding came from the governments of Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, Canada, Britain and Finland, the balance from church and other voluntary groups.
Now, obviously, a full investigation into IUEF became a SA security priority. So, in Pretoria, the operation codenamed “Daisy” was activated. Operatives were assigned to investigate the IUEF and its activities. NUSAS, where the initial IUEF contact had been made in the mid-Sixties and by now a major recipient of IUEF funds, was the obvious starting point: and Craig Williamson a deep cover plant in that radical student organisation, our obvious chosen warrior. A long-time NUSAS office bearer and by then NUSAS Vice President, Craig was running a variety of projects giving him credibility in anti-apartheid circles.
What the SA security forces needed to know was:
Now, obviously, a full investigation into IUEF became a SA security priority. So, in Pretoria, the operation codenamed “Daisy” was activated. Operatives were assigned to investigate the IUEF and its activities. NUSAS, where the initial IUEF contact had been made in the mid-Sixties and by now a major recipient of IUEF funds, was the obvious starting point: and Craig Williamson a deep cover plant in that radical student organisation, our obvious chosen warrior. A long-time NUSAS office bearer and by then NUSAS Vice President, Craig was running a variety of projects giving him credibility in anti-apartheid circles.
What the SA security forces needed to know was:
- Exact nature of the assistance provided by the IUEF for anti-SA revolutionary activity.
- Nature and scope of these activities.
- Motive for adopting a policy of support for violent change in SA and for overtly promoting this policy among prominent Western states and organisations.
- Were donors to IUEF programmes aware that their contributions were being used for illegal and violent revolutionary actions against SA?
In October 1975 Craig went to Europe with NUSAS President-elect Mike Stent, to meet with Eriksson and others. They were told that the role of NUSAS should be that of “conscientising” White students, this to create a group of “dedicated class defectors” who would use their skills in the interests of the “liberation struggle.” The SA Government it was stated, was “moving away from racial inequality… and towards a classical capitalist system,” where oppression would be based on economic factors rather than race.” To subvert this, it was necessary to target foreign investors and foreign investment. - [emphasis added].
Eriksson also urged the two student representatives to make all possible efforts to establish whether the news magazine, To The Point, then SA’s main voice to the outside world, had and SA Government links. “Colin Legum of the London Observer is willing to run a story smearing To The Point if he can get the information.” There were other startling suggestions, not least Ericsson's proposal that NUSAS should engineer the assassination of then-Prime Minister John Vorster.
Eriksson also urged the two student representatives to make all possible efforts to establish whether the news magazine, To The Point, then SA’s main voice to the outside world, had and SA Government links. “Colin Legum of the London Observer is willing to run a story smearing To The Point if he can get the information.” There were other startling suggestions, not least Ericsson's proposal that NUSAS should engineer the assassination of then-Prime Minister John Vorster.
Eriksson formed a favourable impression of Craig as a person of political and personal competence. In 1975 he arranged that he meet ANC/SACP leaders in London: Where Reg September and Thomas Nkobi proceeded to recruit him. They were, he learnt, especially interested in information on Black and White student affairs and student involvement with trade unions and the Black labour movement generally. He would, they said, have to liaise with an Indian male calling himself Ismael Essop, later identified as Aziz Pahad, who would instruct him on what was wanted.
In 1976 Craig’s ANC handlers suggested that he and his associates in SA become involved in distributing ANC literature and propaganda in SA, this to replace ANC/SACP units apprehended and convicted in the big security sweeps of 1975/76. When Eriksson next met Craig, in Botswana in July, 1976, Craig’s passport, because of his well-publicised activities on behalf of NUSAS, had been “officially” withdrawn. An ostensible refugee, he left SA on January 5, 1977, with the IUEF obligingly expediting his travel documents. He was in Geneva within a week of having entered Botswana.
In June 1977 he was appointed IUEF Information Officer, though it was made clear this was a cover for coordinating the gathering of intelligence on SA for the “liberation movements.” From then on, Craig became one of the busiest men in Europe, playing not a double but a treble game. On the one side Eriksson wanted him to assist IUEF in support of the so-called “Third Force” in SA “liberation” politics: that is, Biko’s BCM. On the other, NUSAS radicals and the ANC/SACP wanted him to remain involved in the IUEF, this to destroy its support for the BCM and to channel funding instead into the ANC/SACP-approved projects, while simultaneously assisting with distribution of ANC propaganda and intelligence gathering.
Back home, his handlers in Pretoria accepted the second scenario because (1) they considered BCM’s rise as highly dangerous and (2) it would provide them with detailed information on BCM’s underground activities and its international support. To stunt BCM’s growth Pretoria (in common with the ANC) wanted to curb BCM’s funding, seeing this as a means for Craig to increase ANC goodwill and enabling him to penetrate the ANC still further.
Craig continued to operate with stunning success. In Lusaka he combined with Ray Alexander and Jack Simons in planning the role of SACTU (SA Congress of Trade Unions) in the “liberation” struggle. In London he met with Ronnie Kasrils to help plan a proposed SA general strike. In London again, he met NUSAS and ANC representatives, with NUSAS asked to gain information on Black labour conditions in the Leyland, Fiat, Alfa Romeo, Ford and Olivetti plants. In November 1977 he had meetings with Robben Island graduate and Umkhonto we Sizwe biggie, Mac Maharaj, to be told that his future activities would fall under Umkhonto. In addition to intelligence gathering for the ANC, he was also to incorporate his SA associates in planned sabotage.
At the end of 1977 Craig was appointed IUEF Deputy Director. This was a big breakthrough. Dispensing IUEF funds, he was able to make contact with many additional exile groups. By 1978 almost all BCM funding had been cut off. Craig now was not only IUEF Deputy director, but also in charge of an ANC/SACP unit, directed from London and responsible for:
In 1976 Craig’s ANC handlers suggested that he and his associates in SA become involved in distributing ANC literature and propaganda in SA, this to replace ANC/SACP units apprehended and convicted in the big security sweeps of 1975/76. When Eriksson next met Craig, in Botswana in July, 1976, Craig’s passport, because of his well-publicised activities on behalf of NUSAS, had been “officially” withdrawn. An ostensible refugee, he left SA on January 5, 1977, with the IUEF obligingly expediting his travel documents. He was in Geneva within a week of having entered Botswana.
In June 1977 he was appointed IUEF Information Officer, though it was made clear this was a cover for coordinating the gathering of intelligence on SA for the “liberation movements.” From then on, Craig became one of the busiest men in Europe, playing not a double but a treble game. On the one side Eriksson wanted him to assist IUEF in support of the so-called “Third Force” in SA “liberation” politics: that is, Biko’s BCM. On the other, NUSAS radicals and the ANC/SACP wanted him to remain involved in the IUEF, this to destroy its support for the BCM and to channel funding instead into the ANC/SACP-approved projects, while simultaneously assisting with distribution of ANC propaganda and intelligence gathering.
Back home, his handlers in Pretoria accepted the second scenario because (1) they considered BCM’s rise as highly dangerous and (2) it would provide them with detailed information on BCM’s underground activities and its international support. To stunt BCM’s growth Pretoria (in common with the ANC) wanted to curb BCM’s funding, seeing this as a means for Craig to increase ANC goodwill and enabling him to penetrate the ANC still further.
Craig continued to operate with stunning success. In Lusaka he combined with Ray Alexander and Jack Simons in planning the role of SACTU (SA Congress of Trade Unions) in the “liberation” struggle. In London he met with Ronnie Kasrils to help plan a proposed SA general strike. In London again, he met NUSAS and ANC representatives, with NUSAS asked to gain information on Black labour conditions in the Leyland, Fiat, Alfa Romeo, Ford and Olivetti plants. In November 1977 he had meetings with Robben Island graduate and Umkhonto we Sizwe biggie, Mac Maharaj, to be told that his future activities would fall under Umkhonto. In addition to intelligence gathering for the ANC, he was also to incorporate his SA associates in planned sabotage.
At the end of 1977 Craig was appointed IUEF Deputy Director. This was a big breakthrough. Dispensing IUEF funds, he was able to make contact with many additional exile groups. By 1978 almost all BCM funding had been cut off. Craig now was not only IUEF Deputy director, but also in charge of an ANC/SACP unit, directed from London and responsible for:
- The ANC escape network;
- ANC’s inside-SA propaganda machinery, distribution of leaflets, etc;
- Funding of projects and of individuals carrying out ANC policy in SA.
Much of his credibility with the ANC came from his almost uncanny successes in smuggling people out of SA: one example, Cecilia Msondo, today Oliver Tambo’s secretary. Soon, too, on instructions from the ANC/SACP, he was deeply involved in the channelling of funds to Swapo. Later, as IUEF activities extended more and more in Latin American politics, he became involved in projects involving the Sandinistas of Nicaragua, the Tupamaros of Uruguay and the dreaded Montoneros of Argentina: this theoretically on instructions of the SACP, but clearly originating from somewhere else.
On 7.3.79 Mac Maharaj and Thomas Nkobi visited Geneva. The time had come, they told Craig, to organise a more extensive White involvement in Umkhonto and the armed struggle. A priority task would, therefore, be the identification of sympathetic Whites inside SA who could fulfil this task.
Throughout this time, Craig regularly represented the IUEF at important international anti-apartheid movement conferences and seminars. He played a prominent and active role in the UN Sub-Committee on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Apartheid and Decolonialisation and on the Special Non-Governmental Organisation Committee on Human Rights. He was also an important link between the IUEF and the UN Special Committee on Apartheid. He was seconded to the UN for the Lagos Anti-Apartheid Conference. He was intimately connected with COSAWAR (Committee on South African War Resisters), a London-based group working to support those refusing to do their national service with the SADF; with Canon Collins’s Defence and Aid, and various other anti-apartheid movements. By doing so, he was continuously providing Pretoria with information available to it from no other source. Apart from this “contact” work, Craig was also handling IUEF finances and was in charge of expenditures running up to US$80 million a year. So good was his work, and so useful was he to Eriksson, that towards the end he was being groomed to take up a post as liaison officer between the southern African “liberation” movements and Western governments. But: calamity.
In 1980, the SA intelligence community suffered the defection of an agent, Arthur McGivern, employed as an analyst monitoring student revolutionary action. Because of his job – and because he knew Craig, having studied with him at Wits – McGivern, in correlating incoming reports on operative RS-167’s regular visits behind the Iron Curtain and his involvement in African and Latin American terrorist organisations, correctly concluded that Operative RS-167 could only be one man: Craig Williamson. Tragic as was the loss of such a skilled, well-placed operator, his survival factor was now at stake. His life could not be risked by relying on the discretion of a defector.
Before he could be “burnt” (exposed) Craig was personally brought back to SA by his friend and mentor Brigadier (now General) Johann Coetzee. A while later, publication of his exploits began, disclosing to a vast public audience how a Western organisation, with Western Government back-up, was busy cooperating with Soviet aligned revolutionary groups in the attempted destruction of a Western state. Now the whole world knew about Craig Williamson.
His covert involvement in Geneva had been a smashing success, scoring maximum psychological and propaganda impact against anti-SA revolutionary forces. And, more importantly, he had left the IUEF in total disarray, the whole organisation discredited as politically suspect and financially untrustworthy, to the point where it could never be rehabilitated. In 1981, it was disbanded. What should now be remembered is that while IUEF has gone, many similar Western groups still operate against us, many of the US State Department “educational” and “scholarship” programmes high among them. Like IUEF, the State Department for its own unfathomable purposes als seeks to impose a radical Black-controlled Socialist state upon us.
The best tribute any of us can pay Craig Williamson is this: that while we still have such men working on our behalf, not all of the nation’s defences are down.
On 7.3.79 Mac Maharaj and Thomas Nkobi visited Geneva. The time had come, they told Craig, to organise a more extensive White involvement in Umkhonto and the armed struggle. A priority task would, therefore, be the identification of sympathetic Whites inside SA who could fulfil this task.
Throughout this time, Craig regularly represented the IUEF at important international anti-apartheid movement conferences and seminars. He played a prominent and active role in the UN Sub-Committee on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Apartheid and Decolonialisation and on the Special Non-Governmental Organisation Committee on Human Rights. He was also an important link between the IUEF and the UN Special Committee on Apartheid. He was seconded to the UN for the Lagos Anti-Apartheid Conference. He was intimately connected with COSAWAR (Committee on South African War Resisters), a London-based group working to support those refusing to do their national service with the SADF; with Canon Collins’s Defence and Aid, and various other anti-apartheid movements. By doing so, he was continuously providing Pretoria with information available to it from no other source. Apart from this “contact” work, Craig was also handling IUEF finances and was in charge of expenditures running up to US$80 million a year. So good was his work, and so useful was he to Eriksson, that towards the end he was being groomed to take up a post as liaison officer between the southern African “liberation” movements and Western governments. But: calamity.
In 1980, the SA intelligence community suffered the defection of an agent, Arthur McGivern, employed as an analyst monitoring student revolutionary action. Because of his job – and because he knew Craig, having studied with him at Wits – McGivern, in correlating incoming reports on operative RS-167’s regular visits behind the Iron Curtain and his involvement in African and Latin American terrorist organisations, correctly concluded that Operative RS-167 could only be one man: Craig Williamson. Tragic as was the loss of such a skilled, well-placed operator, his survival factor was now at stake. His life could not be risked by relying on the discretion of a defector.
Before he could be “burnt” (exposed) Craig was personally brought back to SA by his friend and mentor Brigadier (now General) Johann Coetzee. A while later, publication of his exploits began, disclosing to a vast public audience how a Western organisation, with Western Government back-up, was busy cooperating with Soviet aligned revolutionary groups in the attempted destruction of a Western state. Now the whole world knew about Craig Williamson.
His covert involvement in Geneva had been a smashing success, scoring maximum psychological and propaganda impact against anti-SA revolutionary forces. And, more importantly, he had left the IUEF in total disarray, the whole organisation discredited as politically suspect and financially untrustworthy, to the point where it could never be rehabilitated. In 1981, it was disbanded. What should now be remembered is that while IUEF has gone, many similar Western groups still operate against us, many of the US State Department “educational” and “scholarship” programmes high among them. Like IUEF, the State Department for its own unfathomable purposes als seeks to impose a radical Black-controlled Socialist state upon us.
The best tribute any of us can pay Craig Williamson is this: that while we still have such men working on our behalf, not all of the nation’s defences are down.
Footnote:
SOMETHING few people know is that Craig Williamson had a little sister, Lisa-Jane, whose courage and exploits as a SA Security Police agent very nearly equalled his own. While Craig served as a deep-cover operative overseas, she performed much the same function here, running various organisations and acting as a conduit for funds Craig organised internationally. Through the groups she controlled, in particular the Prisoners Support Trust and an educational trust, Lisa channelled overseas money to hundreds of individuals, high among them the families of past or present Robben Island prisoners. She also channelled funds to various community and other political structures organising pro-ANC activities throughout SA.
Additionally, she was a conduit for funds going to Swapo’s internal wing in SWA. At one stage, so confident were they of her bona fides, that Lisa actually ran the SWA Swapo office after its hierarchy had been detained. She also regularly toured northern SWA with Swapo officials and was responsible for visiting and giving financial support to Sam Nujoma’s mother, living near the Angolan border.
On one memorable Lisa moved into such sensitive Swapo territory that the terrorist group provided her with an armed escort. In this way, she managed to identify numbers of individuals and houses used by the Swapo underground. Such information was invaluable to counterterrorist units such as Koevoet and to the SA Security Police.
Even more amazingly, Lisa became a member of an Umkhonto we Sizwe unit run out of Maseru in Lesotho by Chris Hani, recently appointed Deputy Commander of Umkhonto. One of the most critical ANC sabotage efforts she managed to torpedo was a proposed strike aimed at destroying the big SABC buildings in Auckland Park and the Brixton TV Tower: which explains the exceptionally heavy security now conspicuous on both installations. On many occasion Lisa physically participated in political escapes from SA.
In recognition of her work, Lisa was awarded the coveted SA Police Medal for Combatting Terrorism.
Lisa was tragically killed in a motor accident.
SOMETHING few people know is that Craig Williamson had a little sister, Lisa-Jane, whose courage and exploits as a SA Security Police agent very nearly equalled his own. While Craig served as a deep-cover operative overseas, she performed much the same function here, running various organisations and acting as a conduit for funds Craig organised internationally. Through the groups she controlled, in particular the Prisoners Support Trust and an educational trust, Lisa channelled overseas money to hundreds of individuals, high among them the families of past or present Robben Island prisoners. She also channelled funds to various community and other political structures organising pro-ANC activities throughout SA.
Additionally, she was a conduit for funds going to Swapo’s internal wing in SWA. At one stage, so confident were they of her bona fides, that Lisa actually ran the SWA Swapo office after its hierarchy had been detained. She also regularly toured northern SWA with Swapo officials and was responsible for visiting and giving financial support to Sam Nujoma’s mother, living near the Angolan border.
On one memorable Lisa moved into such sensitive Swapo territory that the terrorist group provided her with an armed escort. In this way, she managed to identify numbers of individuals and houses used by the Swapo underground. Such information was invaluable to counterterrorist units such as Koevoet and to the SA Security Police.
Even more amazingly, Lisa became a member of an Umkhonto we Sizwe unit run out of Maseru in Lesotho by Chris Hani, recently appointed Deputy Commander of Umkhonto. One of the most critical ANC sabotage efforts she managed to torpedo was a proposed strike aimed at destroying the big SABC buildings in Auckland Park and the Brixton TV Tower: which explains the exceptionally heavy security now conspicuous on both installations. On many occasion Lisa physically participated in political escapes from SA.
In recognition of her work, Lisa was awarded the coveted SA Police Medal for Combatting Terrorism.
Lisa was tragically killed in a motor accident.
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