One of the most shocking incidents of terror in South African history occurred on 20 May 1983. A motor car loaded with powerful explosives was detonated at around four o’clock in the afternoon right in front of a Nedbank Square building. (Commonly known as Nedbank Square Maritime House). Altogether 19 people died, including 12 civilians and 7 members of the army. In total 219 people were either severely injured or maimed, of which 217 were civilians and 2 were army members. In his book “The Long Walk to Freedom”, Mr Mandela expressed his regret over the incident but, at the same time, stated that the ANC accepted that incidents of this nature would occur during the armed struggle.
Various members of the NEC were not in the country when these attacks were at their fiercest levels and, as such, escaped prosecution.
During 1996, Col de Kock was found guilty in the Supreme Court in Pretoria and was sentenced to life plus 80 years imprisonment for the five murders that took place at Nelspruit. In total he received two life sentences plus 212 years imprisonment on six other counts of murder (including that of Japie Maponya), various counts of attempted murder and other charges.
With the exception of the murders that took place at Nelspruit, the various amnesty committees found that all the other incidents were committed with a political objective and were, in fact, connected to the conflict of the past. He was refused amnesty on two of these counts as it was felt he had not made a full disclosure. Application for a revision of these cases would unquestionably have succeeded. However, even Adv Hattingh, who appeared on behalf of Col de Kock in all of his amnesty hearings, conceded that there was no possibility of a successful revision in the Nelspruit case. It would therefore not have benefited him to apply for a revision.
Sometimes the impression is created that Eugene de Kock is in a fix while the generals are scot-free - but this stems from ignorance of the facts. In the Nelspruit case, Col de Kock tried to implicate General Krappies Engelberecht but, during the criminal and amnesty hearings, conclusive evidence was presented to the effect that his assertions were unfounded.
In the Rapport of 10 January 2010, Jacques Pauw insisted, inter alia, that Gen Engelbrecht be brought to trial. It is not clear whether this stems from malice or from an inability to grasp the evidence given during the criminal and amnesty hearings.
There isn't a shred of evidence on which Gen Engelbrecht can be prosecuted and we challenge Mr Pauw to demonstrate on what grounds he believes Gen Engelbrecht could be charged.
There is no evidence whatsoever that any of the generals was implicated in any of the murders which Col de Kock was found guilty of. In the Maponya case General le Roux was still a colonel and was refused amnesty along with Col de Kock.
However, as Mr Malan ably demonstrated in his minority finding, amnesty was wrongly denied in the Maponya case. Mr Pauw and any of his like-minded colleagues can quite safely read Mr Malan’s finding and perhaps get someone with a legal background to explain it to them.
Apparently the principle of equality before the law had to give way before the harsh manner in which prosecution of former members of the Security Branch was insisted upon. As any advocate experienced in criminal law will confirm, on the basis of common purpose there exists, purely from what can be seen, damning evidence to prosecute all those members of the NEC who were not granted amnesty. It is striking, however, that no one seems to insist that equality before the law should be maintained.
Lately the possible pardoning of Col de Eugene de Kock has been severely criticised and persons, who presumably haven’t the vaguest idea what Afrikaner character is all about, loudly condemned the move on behalf of the Afrikaner. They have even less insight into the disgusting and objectionable conditions Col de Kock was exposed to during his career in the police.
On various occasions he was decorated with medals for gallantry. During the negotiation process the members of the Vlakplaas Unit became an embarrassment for Mr de Klerk and his cabinet who were more concerned about winning favour with the ANC at that stage. As a result they had to get rid of the unit. Members of the unit were treated like lepers and this undoubtedly caused much bitterness within their ranks.
While negotiations regarding amnesty were in progress and a general amnesty for all was being strongly considered, Judge Goldstone began to investigate cases against Col de Kock and other members of the Security Branch, which were associated with a political objective and committed in the conflict of the past. Gen Johan van der Merwe approached Mr de Klerk and objected to this and called for the investigation to be stopped - but. Mr de Klerk wouldn’t hear of it indicating that it would give the impression that he was trying to cover up the atrocities of the Security Branch.
Members of the South African Police were expressly forbidden by Mr de Klerk to investigate similar charges against members of the ANC. Had the principal of equality before the law been adhered to, and law and justice prevailed, the investigation of all such cases would have been put on hold until there was clarity surrounding the matter of amnesty. Had this been the case, Col de Kock would, without doubt, have received a lighter sentence because he could only have been prosecuted for the Nelspruit incident and on the theft charges. The judge would also have had the advantage of knowing material facts uncovered during the amnesty process, which would definitely have set the hearings in a different light.
In a letter to Rapport on 10 January 2010 Mr Koos van der Merwe, well known member of Parliament and one of the few remaining political leaders of the old dispensation who has the courage of his convictions and who has the backbone to state his case in public, said as follows:
Various members of the NEC were not in the country when these attacks were at their fiercest levels and, as such, escaped prosecution.
During 1996, Col de Kock was found guilty in the Supreme Court in Pretoria and was sentenced to life plus 80 years imprisonment for the five murders that took place at Nelspruit. In total he received two life sentences plus 212 years imprisonment on six other counts of murder (including that of Japie Maponya), various counts of attempted murder and other charges.
With the exception of the murders that took place at Nelspruit, the various amnesty committees found that all the other incidents were committed with a political objective and were, in fact, connected to the conflict of the past. He was refused amnesty on two of these counts as it was felt he had not made a full disclosure. Application for a revision of these cases would unquestionably have succeeded. However, even Adv Hattingh, who appeared on behalf of Col de Kock in all of his amnesty hearings, conceded that there was no possibility of a successful revision in the Nelspruit case. It would therefore not have benefited him to apply for a revision.
Sometimes the impression is created that Eugene de Kock is in a fix while the generals are scot-free - but this stems from ignorance of the facts. In the Nelspruit case, Col de Kock tried to implicate General Krappies Engelberecht but, during the criminal and amnesty hearings, conclusive evidence was presented to the effect that his assertions were unfounded.
In the Rapport of 10 January 2010, Jacques Pauw insisted, inter alia, that Gen Engelbrecht be brought to trial. It is not clear whether this stems from malice or from an inability to grasp the evidence given during the criminal and amnesty hearings.
There isn't a shred of evidence on which Gen Engelbrecht can be prosecuted and we challenge Mr Pauw to demonstrate on what grounds he believes Gen Engelbrecht could be charged.
There is no evidence whatsoever that any of the generals was implicated in any of the murders which Col de Kock was found guilty of. In the Maponya case General le Roux was still a colonel and was refused amnesty along with Col de Kock.
However, as Mr Malan ably demonstrated in his minority finding, amnesty was wrongly denied in the Maponya case. Mr Pauw and any of his like-minded colleagues can quite safely read Mr Malan’s finding and perhaps get someone with a legal background to explain it to them.
Apparently the principle of equality before the law had to give way before the harsh manner in which prosecution of former members of the Security Branch was insisted upon. As any advocate experienced in criminal law will confirm, on the basis of common purpose there exists, purely from what can be seen, damning evidence to prosecute all those members of the NEC who were not granted amnesty. It is striking, however, that no one seems to insist that equality before the law should be maintained.
Lately the possible pardoning of Col de Eugene de Kock has been severely criticised and persons, who presumably haven’t the vaguest idea what Afrikaner character is all about, loudly condemned the move on behalf of the Afrikaner. They have even less insight into the disgusting and objectionable conditions Col de Kock was exposed to during his career in the police.
On various occasions he was decorated with medals for gallantry. During the negotiation process the members of the Vlakplaas Unit became an embarrassment for Mr de Klerk and his cabinet who were more concerned about winning favour with the ANC at that stage. As a result they had to get rid of the unit. Members of the unit were treated like lepers and this undoubtedly caused much bitterness within their ranks.
While negotiations regarding amnesty were in progress and a general amnesty for all was being strongly considered, Judge Goldstone began to investigate cases against Col de Kock and other members of the Security Branch, which were associated with a political objective and committed in the conflict of the past. Gen Johan van der Merwe approached Mr de Klerk and objected to this and called for the investigation to be stopped - but. Mr de Klerk wouldn’t hear of it indicating that it would give the impression that he was trying to cover up the atrocities of the Security Branch.
Members of the South African Police were expressly forbidden by Mr de Klerk to investigate similar charges against members of the ANC. Had the principal of equality before the law been adhered to, and law and justice prevailed, the investigation of all such cases would have been put on hold until there was clarity surrounding the matter of amnesty. Had this been the case, Col de Kock would, without doubt, have received a lighter sentence because he could only have been prosecuted for the Nelspruit incident and on the theft charges. The judge would also have had the advantage of knowing material facts uncovered during the amnesty process, which would definitely have set the hearings in a different light.
In a letter to Rapport on 10 January 2010 Mr Koos van der Merwe, well known member of Parliament and one of the few remaining political leaders of the old dispensation who has the courage of his convictions and who has the backbone to state his case in public, said as follows:
ONE of the most shocking incidents in the history of South Africa during the conflict of the past when terrorism prevailed, took place on 20 May 1983. A car with a powerful explosive charge exploded at about four o'clock in the afternoon in front of the Nedbank Square Maritime House in Church Street, Pretoria. It was peak period and a total of 19 people were killed, including 12 civilians and seven Army members. A total of 219 people were severely injured or disabled, including 217 civilians and two army members.
The headquarters of the South African Air Force was on the first, second and third floors of the building. The rest of the thirteen floors were used by civilians. On the ground floor was a cafe and other businesses.
Col. Basie Smit (later General) and Maj. Suiker Britz (later General) of the Criminal Investigation Division was at that time in Club 34, not far from the disaster scene. They rushed to the scene and were the first police officers on the scene. They were met with a hideous face of death and destruction. Everywhere corpses, severely injured or maimed people, limbs, pieces of scorched flesh, bones and blood-stained torn clothes were lying around. In front of the building was the wreckage of a car with human remains, believed to be the origin of the explosion.
Members of the task force and counterinsurgency unit under the command of General. Bert Wandrag and Maj. Loots of the Anti-Riot Unit immediately fenced off the area so that potential evidence could not be disturbed.
Experts in various fields immediately set to work. The Forensic Science Laboratory under General. Lothar Neethling careful surveyed the scene, The engineering division of the Quartermaster examined the car wreckage and explosives experts combed the scene to determine what kind of explosives and how much explosives were used. Everything was captured on film with video and other cameras.
The Forensic Science Laboratory later determined by blood and tissue tests which limbs belong to whom and identified the 19 victims.
On arrival at the scene, Maj. Britz observed across the road in line with the wreck the corpse of a man. The man looked familiar to him, but he could not remember where he had seen his face. After helping at the disaster scene, he returned to his home where he consulted his files and photos of people whom he had arrested. He identified the man as Ezekiel Maseko whom he arrested years ago for housebreaking, theft and armed robbery. Maseko was found guilty of all charges and sentenced to imprisonment. It was indeed his corpse who laid across the road in line with the wreck
The next day an investigating team consisting of members of the security, detective branch, murder and robbery unit and the Forensic Science Laboratory was established. Capt. Frik Nel and lt. Hennie Britz of the security branch were part of the team.
Information gathered by the different units, was daily put together to get an overall picture of the incident. Capt. Nel determined through an informer that Maseko and Freddie Shongwe were involved in the explosion. It confirmed information given by Maj. Suiker Britz and they proceeded to Maseko's home in Mamelodi East, where they found his mother. She told them that Maseko called her early in the day and said he was on his way to their home with a car from Swaziland. He and another man arrived later in a Colt Galant. They removed the engine number of the car with an angle grinder. She showed them the angle grinder and the iron filings. Lt. Hennie Britz took possession of the angle grinder which was handed in as a an exhibit.. Maseko's mother also gave them a metal case containing R3 000 in cash which Maseko brought from Swaziland.
Members of the Forensic Science Laboratory later analyzed samples of iron filings and found that it came from the wreck containing the explosive charge.
Capt. Nel and lt. Hennie Britz then questioned Shongwe's mother. She recognized the remains of the clothes as her son's clothes and consequently confirmed that it was indeed Shongwe's mutilated body which was in the wreckage of the Colt Galant. Like Maseko Shongwe was a hardened criminal. The white Colt Galant which was used for the explosion, was stolen on the East Rand about a year before the incident.
It was established that Maseko and Shongwe drove Maseko's Kombi to the city center and from there took the Colt Galant to Nedbank Square Maritime House A search for the Kombi was immediately conducted because the investigation team was convinced that it must have been parked not far from the scene. Two members of the security traced the Kombi near the disaster scene where it was parked on the pavement in front a parking lot on the corner of Schubert- and Vermeulen Streets. In the Kombi was a portable radio that was turned into a transmitter to activate the receiver of the explosives. The transmitter had a switch to activate the remote mechanism. Remnants of the receiving device was found in the wreckage of the Colt Galant. It also had a switch to activate the remote control mechanism of the receiver.
It appears that Shongwe parked the Colt Galant with the bomb and receiver in Church Street in front of the Nedbank Square Maritime House. He sat there while Maseko activated the remote control mechanism of the transmitter in the Kombi. Maseko returned and gave Shongwe the sign on the other side of the road who activated the receiver. The bomb exploded immediately. It appears that they confused the working of the transmitter and receiver and activated the transmitter first and thereafter the receiver whilst it should have been done vice versa.
It was disclosed during the amnesty hearings that Aboobaker Ismael and John Mnisi placed the explosives and the remote mechanism in the Colt Galant. Aboobaker Ismael was a commanding officer of Umkhonto weSizwe. John Mnisi have been arrested by the security in 1981, but after his arrest he gave so much valuable information that it was decided not to prosecute him. He was linked to the Vlakplaas unit as askari, where he initially cooperating fully. His brother was also later arrested and used as askari, but the two later fled and rejoined the ANC. (The word "askari" is used in various languages, including Arabic and Swahili, and means "warrior". In our case, the term was used for members of Umkhonto we Sizwe and other organizations whom we arrested and persuaded to work for the security branch.)
Mnisi recruited Maseko en Shongwe, as mentioned two hardened criminals, who were trained in Swaziland as MK-members. The remote control mechanism was tested in Zambia. Maseko en Shongwe were taught how to handle the remote control mechanism which would be used in the car bomb. The teaching obvious failed,
Helene Pastoors, a Belgian citizen was a member of the Special Operations Unit of Umkhonto weSizwe. During May 1983 she received instructions from Aboobaker Ismail, to drive a motor vehicle which had been primed with explosives from Swaziland to a specified place in Pretoria. She drove the Colt Galant to Pretoria on 19 May 1983 and left it at the pre-arranged place as instructed
Aboobaker Ismael applied for amnesty in respect of the Church Street bombing and the decision amnesty committee reads as follows:
The Applicant was a member of the Special Operations Unit of Umkhonto weSizwe. During May 1983 she received instructions from her superior officer, one Aboobaker Ismail, to drive a motor vehicle which had been primed with explosives from Swaziland to a specified place in Pretoria. She drove the vehicle to Pretoria on 19 May 1983 and left it at the pre-arranged place as instructed. When she delivered the vehicle she did not know the target at which it would be used. She only learnt after the event that it was used in the car bomb operation outside the building in Church Street, Pretoria, which housed the Air Force headquarters.
We are satisfied that the Applicant has made a full disclosure of all relevant facts and that her actions in driving the vehicle to Pretoria were associated with a political objective. We are also satisfied that her application complies with the requirements of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No.34 of 1995.
The Applicant is accordingly GRANTED amnesty in respect of the unlawful delivery from Swaziland to Pretoria on 19 May 1983 of a motor vehicle which contained explosive material.
The Amnesty Committee concluded as follows:
The Church Street bombing took place shortly after a parliamentary debate on the tricameral constitution and subsequent to the December 1982 SADF raid into Maseru in which a number of ANC supporters and Lesotho civilians were killed and the assassination of Ruth First in Maputo. The evidence before us is that the bombing was a planned operation. The target was selected subsequent to reconnaissance being carried out and the bomb was specifically constructed and infiltrated into the country for the operation. The stated objective of the operation was to carry out a highly visible attack on security force members which could not be covered up by the authorities. The operation was discussed at the highest level of Special Operations Command. It was considered that the target was overwhelmingly military and the question of civilian casualties was taken into account before arriving at the decision to proceed with the operation. Approval to go ahead with the operation was also obtained from Oliver Tambo, the President of the ANC.
We are satisfied that the bombing was an act associated with a political objective as envisaged by Section 20 of the Act and that it was not merely an act of anarchy or terrorism. The fact that the bombing took place before the Kabwe Conference does not mean that the target selection was against ANC policy. It was always the policy of MK to target security force personnel and, with regard to the civilian casualties, the operation was given prior approval by the highest authority in the ANC and the ANC acknowledged responsibility for the blast shortly after its occurrence. We are also of the view that the bombing was not racially motivated. The blast occurred in a busy public street and the civilian casualties included both blacks and whites. There was no possibility whatsoever in the circumstances of targeting a particular racial group.
The Applicant, Aboobaker Ismail, testified that at the time of the funeral after the Maseru massacre Oliver Tambo "had raised the issue that if the then government justified its action on the basis that civilians were killed because the ANC had set up bases amongst the civilian population, then would it also not be justified for the ANC to carry out operations against enemy headquarters and bases located within built-up areas". This, as well as the objective of carrying out a highly visible attack against military personnel which could not be covered up were, no doubt, factors taken into account in selecting the target. It was accepted by Special Operations Command that the blast, which would primarily be aimed at the military personnel who would gather at the bus stop immediately in front of the building which housed the SAAF Headquarters would also result in civilian casualties. The blast was an act of war which struck a severe blow at the ANC's enemy and which introduced a new phase of guerilla warfare in the struggle. Although the consequences of the blast were gruesome and tragic and affected many innocent civilians we, after careful consideration, are of the view that the manner of the execution of the operation was not disproportionate to the political objective pursued.
It is remarkable how superficially the amnesty committee dealt with this gruesome incident, the largest terrorist act in the history of South Africa. In contrast, applications by members of the security branch where members of Umkhonto we Sizwe or political activists were killed, were subjected to the most extreme measures in an effort to expose them as liars. There is a vast difference between a military basis in Maseru and Church Street Pretoria which is mostly used by civilians not involved in any military or politically motivated actions. The following crucial issues were not probed or considered by the amnesty committee:
The headquarters of the South African Air Force was on the first, second and third floors of the building. The rest of the thirteen floors were used by civilians. On the ground floor was a cafe and other businesses.
Col. Basie Smit (later General) and Maj. Suiker Britz (later General) of the Criminal Investigation Division was at that time in Club 34, not far from the disaster scene. They rushed to the scene and were the first police officers on the scene. They were met with a hideous face of death and destruction. Everywhere corpses, severely injured or maimed people, limbs, pieces of scorched flesh, bones and blood-stained torn clothes were lying around. In front of the building was the wreckage of a car with human remains, believed to be the origin of the explosion.
Members of the task force and counterinsurgency unit under the command of General. Bert Wandrag and Maj. Loots of the Anti-Riot Unit immediately fenced off the area so that potential evidence could not be disturbed.
Experts in various fields immediately set to work. The Forensic Science Laboratory under General. Lothar Neethling careful surveyed the scene, The engineering division of the Quartermaster examined the car wreckage and explosives experts combed the scene to determine what kind of explosives and how much explosives were used. Everything was captured on film with video and other cameras.
The Forensic Science Laboratory later determined by blood and tissue tests which limbs belong to whom and identified the 19 victims.
On arrival at the scene, Maj. Britz observed across the road in line with the wreck the corpse of a man. The man looked familiar to him, but he could not remember where he had seen his face. After helping at the disaster scene, he returned to his home where he consulted his files and photos of people whom he had arrested. He identified the man as Ezekiel Maseko whom he arrested years ago for housebreaking, theft and armed robbery. Maseko was found guilty of all charges and sentenced to imprisonment. It was indeed his corpse who laid across the road in line with the wreck
The next day an investigating team consisting of members of the security, detective branch, murder and robbery unit and the Forensic Science Laboratory was established. Capt. Frik Nel and lt. Hennie Britz of the security branch were part of the team.
Information gathered by the different units, was daily put together to get an overall picture of the incident. Capt. Nel determined through an informer that Maseko and Freddie Shongwe were involved in the explosion. It confirmed information given by Maj. Suiker Britz and they proceeded to Maseko's home in Mamelodi East, where they found his mother. She told them that Maseko called her early in the day and said he was on his way to their home with a car from Swaziland. He and another man arrived later in a Colt Galant. They removed the engine number of the car with an angle grinder. She showed them the angle grinder and the iron filings. Lt. Hennie Britz took possession of the angle grinder which was handed in as a an exhibit.. Maseko's mother also gave them a metal case containing R3 000 in cash which Maseko brought from Swaziland.
Members of the Forensic Science Laboratory later analyzed samples of iron filings and found that it came from the wreck containing the explosive charge.
Capt. Nel and lt. Hennie Britz then questioned Shongwe's mother. She recognized the remains of the clothes as her son's clothes and consequently confirmed that it was indeed Shongwe's mutilated body which was in the wreckage of the Colt Galant. Like Maseko Shongwe was a hardened criminal. The white Colt Galant which was used for the explosion, was stolen on the East Rand about a year before the incident.
It was established that Maseko and Shongwe drove Maseko's Kombi to the city center and from there took the Colt Galant to Nedbank Square Maritime House A search for the Kombi was immediately conducted because the investigation team was convinced that it must have been parked not far from the scene. Two members of the security traced the Kombi near the disaster scene where it was parked on the pavement in front a parking lot on the corner of Schubert- and Vermeulen Streets. In the Kombi was a portable radio that was turned into a transmitter to activate the receiver of the explosives. The transmitter had a switch to activate the remote mechanism. Remnants of the receiving device was found in the wreckage of the Colt Galant. It also had a switch to activate the remote control mechanism of the receiver.
It appears that Shongwe parked the Colt Galant with the bomb and receiver in Church Street in front of the Nedbank Square Maritime House. He sat there while Maseko activated the remote control mechanism of the transmitter in the Kombi. Maseko returned and gave Shongwe the sign on the other side of the road who activated the receiver. The bomb exploded immediately. It appears that they confused the working of the transmitter and receiver and activated the transmitter first and thereafter the receiver whilst it should have been done vice versa.
It was disclosed during the amnesty hearings that Aboobaker Ismael and John Mnisi placed the explosives and the remote mechanism in the Colt Galant. Aboobaker Ismael was a commanding officer of Umkhonto weSizwe. John Mnisi have been arrested by the security in 1981, but after his arrest he gave so much valuable information that it was decided not to prosecute him. He was linked to the Vlakplaas unit as askari, where he initially cooperating fully. His brother was also later arrested and used as askari, but the two later fled and rejoined the ANC. (The word "askari" is used in various languages, including Arabic and Swahili, and means "warrior". In our case, the term was used for members of Umkhonto we Sizwe and other organizations whom we arrested and persuaded to work for the security branch.)
Mnisi recruited Maseko en Shongwe, as mentioned two hardened criminals, who were trained in Swaziland as MK-members. The remote control mechanism was tested in Zambia. Maseko en Shongwe were taught how to handle the remote control mechanism which would be used in the car bomb. The teaching obvious failed,
Helene Pastoors, a Belgian citizen was a member of the Special Operations Unit of Umkhonto weSizwe. During May 1983 she received instructions from Aboobaker Ismail, to drive a motor vehicle which had been primed with explosives from Swaziland to a specified place in Pretoria. She drove the Colt Galant to Pretoria on 19 May 1983 and left it at the pre-arranged place as instructed
Aboobaker Ismael applied for amnesty in respect of the Church Street bombing and the decision amnesty committee reads as follows:
The Applicant was a member of the Special Operations Unit of Umkhonto weSizwe. During May 1983 she received instructions from her superior officer, one Aboobaker Ismail, to drive a motor vehicle which had been primed with explosives from Swaziland to a specified place in Pretoria. She drove the vehicle to Pretoria on 19 May 1983 and left it at the pre-arranged place as instructed. When she delivered the vehicle she did not know the target at which it would be used. She only learnt after the event that it was used in the car bomb operation outside the building in Church Street, Pretoria, which housed the Air Force headquarters.
We are satisfied that the Applicant has made a full disclosure of all relevant facts and that her actions in driving the vehicle to Pretoria were associated with a political objective. We are also satisfied that her application complies with the requirements of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No.34 of 1995.
The Applicant is accordingly GRANTED amnesty in respect of the unlawful delivery from Swaziland to Pretoria on 19 May 1983 of a motor vehicle which contained explosive material.
The Amnesty Committee concluded as follows:
The Church Street bombing took place shortly after a parliamentary debate on the tricameral constitution and subsequent to the December 1982 SADF raid into Maseru in which a number of ANC supporters and Lesotho civilians were killed and the assassination of Ruth First in Maputo. The evidence before us is that the bombing was a planned operation. The target was selected subsequent to reconnaissance being carried out and the bomb was specifically constructed and infiltrated into the country for the operation. The stated objective of the operation was to carry out a highly visible attack on security force members which could not be covered up by the authorities. The operation was discussed at the highest level of Special Operations Command. It was considered that the target was overwhelmingly military and the question of civilian casualties was taken into account before arriving at the decision to proceed with the operation. Approval to go ahead with the operation was also obtained from Oliver Tambo, the President of the ANC.
We are satisfied that the bombing was an act associated with a political objective as envisaged by Section 20 of the Act and that it was not merely an act of anarchy or terrorism. The fact that the bombing took place before the Kabwe Conference does not mean that the target selection was against ANC policy. It was always the policy of MK to target security force personnel and, with regard to the civilian casualties, the operation was given prior approval by the highest authority in the ANC and the ANC acknowledged responsibility for the blast shortly after its occurrence. We are also of the view that the bombing was not racially motivated. The blast occurred in a busy public street and the civilian casualties included both blacks and whites. There was no possibility whatsoever in the circumstances of targeting a particular racial group.
The Applicant, Aboobaker Ismail, testified that at the time of the funeral after the Maseru massacre Oliver Tambo "had raised the issue that if the then government justified its action on the basis that civilians were killed because the ANC had set up bases amongst the civilian population, then would it also not be justified for the ANC to carry out operations against enemy headquarters and bases located within built-up areas". This, as well as the objective of carrying out a highly visible attack against military personnel which could not be covered up were, no doubt, factors taken into account in selecting the target. It was accepted by Special Operations Command that the blast, which would primarily be aimed at the military personnel who would gather at the bus stop immediately in front of the building which housed the SAAF Headquarters would also result in civilian casualties. The blast was an act of war which struck a severe blow at the ANC's enemy and which introduced a new phase of guerilla warfare in the struggle. Although the consequences of the blast were gruesome and tragic and affected many innocent civilians we, after careful consideration, are of the view that the manner of the execution of the operation was not disproportionate to the political objective pursued.
It is remarkable how superficially the amnesty committee dealt with this gruesome incident, the largest terrorist act in the history of South Africa. In contrast, applications by members of the security branch where members of Umkhonto we Sizwe or political activists were killed, were subjected to the most extreme measures in an effort to expose them as liars. There is a vast difference between a military basis in Maseru and Church Street Pretoria which is mostly used by civilians not involved in any military or politically motivated actions. The following crucial issues were not probed or considered by the amnesty committee:
- Who served on the Special Operations Command? – They were all guilty of murder;
- The incident was a serious transgression of the Geneva Convention Protocol which stipulates that civilians may not be attacked.
- None of the members of the Regional Politico-Military Committee (RPMC) testify to confirm the version of Mr. Aboobaker Ismael.
- The Senior Organs in the ANC were during 1983 replaced by Regional Politico-Military Committees (RPMCs), and were also given the authority and responsibility for making operational decisions. The RPMCs were charged with coordinating political and military activities in their areas of responsibility and were still subject to the policy of the ANC and the Politico-Military Council. All persons who served in these structures were guilty of murder;
- A total of 19 people were killed, including 12 civilians and seven Army members. A total of 219 people were severely injured or disabled, including 217 civilians and two army members. The incident occurred during peak hours in Church Street mostly used by civilians, including women and children. Nedbank Square Maritime House consisted of 13 floors and only the first three floors were occupied by the Airforce. These facts are not mentioned in the decision of the amnesty committee neither is there any indication on which grounds the following conclusion of the amnesty committee is based:
“The blast was an act of war which struck a severe blow at the ANC's enemy and which introduced a new phase of guerilla warfare in the struggle. Although the consequences of the blast were gruesome and tragic and affected many innocent civilians we, after careful consideration, are of the view that the manner of the execution of the operation was not disproportionate to the political objective pursued”
In terms of International Law terrorism is defined as the calculated use of unlawful violence or the threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological.
Guerrilla warfare is a form of irregular warfare in which a small group of combatants such as paramilitary personnel, armed civilians, or irregulars use military tactics including ambushes, sabotage, raids, petty warfare, hit-and-run tactics, and mobility to fight a larger and less-mobile traditional military.
It is obvious that the amnesty committee did not have the slightest idea what guerrilla warfare entails.
The National Executive Committee (NEC) of the ANC during the period 1983 to 1985 consisted of the following persons:
President: OR Tambo
Treasurer: Thomas Nkobi
Secretary General: Alfred Nzo
Administrative secretary of the NEC: Joe Nhlanhla.
Other members: Mzwai Piliso, Moses Mabhida, Joe Modise, Joe Jele, John Motshabi, Andrew Masondo, Robert Manci, Joe Gqabi, Jacob Zuma, Steve Dlamini, John Nkadimeng, Simon Makana, Gertrude Shope, Florence Moposho, Chris Hani, Thabo Mbeki, Johnny Makathini.
The Politico-Military Council (PMC) during the same period consisted of
Chair: OR Tambo
Treasurer: Reg September
The Secretary of the PMC was Joe Nhlanhla, until 1987
MHQ representatives on the PMC: Joe Modise, Joe Slovo, Chris Hani.
PHQ representatives on the PMC: Joe Jele, Mac Maharaj, Jacob Zuma, John Motshabi, Ruth Mompati
NAT representative on the PMC: Mzwai Piliso
Other members included: Alfred Nzo, T.T. Nkobi, Job Tlhabane ("Cassius Make"), Sizakele Sigxashe, Andrew Masondo, Moses Mabhida, John Nkadimeng.
Although most of these persons already died, persons such as Mr. Jacob Zuma, Thabo Mbeki and Mac Maharaj who did not apply for amnesty in respect of the Church Street bombing can be charged for murder on the principle of common purpose as provided for in our law. Mr. Aboobaker Ismael and all the other MK-members who were granted amnesty can be compelled in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act to testify against them. There is consequently ample evidence available but the National Prosecuting Authority as to yet did not charge them neither are there any indications of such an intention. In stark contrast various leaders and generals of the previous regime were prosecuted for crimes associated with a political motive in the conflict of the past and former members of the security branch are still being prosecuted.
Guerrilla warfare is a form of irregular warfare in which a small group of combatants such as paramilitary personnel, armed civilians, or irregulars use military tactics including ambushes, sabotage, raids, petty warfare, hit-and-run tactics, and mobility to fight a larger and less-mobile traditional military.
It is obvious that the amnesty committee did not have the slightest idea what guerrilla warfare entails.
The National Executive Committee (NEC) of the ANC during the period 1983 to 1985 consisted of the following persons:
President: OR Tambo
Treasurer: Thomas Nkobi
Secretary General: Alfred Nzo
Administrative secretary of the NEC: Joe Nhlanhla.
Other members: Mzwai Piliso, Moses Mabhida, Joe Modise, Joe Jele, John Motshabi, Andrew Masondo, Robert Manci, Joe Gqabi, Jacob Zuma, Steve Dlamini, John Nkadimeng, Simon Makana, Gertrude Shope, Florence Moposho, Chris Hani, Thabo Mbeki, Johnny Makathini.
The Politico-Military Council (PMC) during the same period consisted of
Chair: OR Tambo
Treasurer: Reg September
The Secretary of the PMC was Joe Nhlanhla, until 1987
MHQ representatives on the PMC: Joe Modise, Joe Slovo, Chris Hani.
PHQ representatives on the PMC: Joe Jele, Mac Maharaj, Jacob Zuma, John Motshabi, Ruth Mompati
NAT representative on the PMC: Mzwai Piliso
Other members included: Alfred Nzo, T.T. Nkobi, Job Tlhabane ("Cassius Make"), Sizakele Sigxashe, Andrew Masondo, Moses Mabhida, John Nkadimeng.
Although most of these persons already died, persons such as Mr. Jacob Zuma, Thabo Mbeki and Mac Maharaj who did not apply for amnesty in respect of the Church Street bombing can be charged for murder on the principle of common purpose as provided for in our law. Mr. Aboobaker Ismael and all the other MK-members who were granted amnesty can be compelled in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act to testify against them. There is consequently ample evidence available but the National Prosecuting Authority as to yet did not charge them neither are there any indications of such an intention. In stark contrast various leaders and generals of the previous regime were prosecuted for crimes associated with a political motive in the conflict of the past and former members of the security branch are still being prosecuted.
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