One of the most shocking incidents of terror in South African history occurred on 20 May 1983. A motor car loaded with powerful explosives was detonated at around four o’clock in the afternoon right in front of a Nedbank Square building. (Commonly known as Nedbank Square Maritime House). Altogether 19 people died, including 12 civilians and 7 members of the army. In total 219 people were either severely injured or maimed, of which 217 were civilians and 2 were army members. In his book “The Long Walk to Freedom”, Mr Mandela expressed his regret over the incident but, at the same time, stated that the ANC accepted that incidents of this nature would occur during the armed struggle.
Various members of the NEC were not in the country when these attacks were at their fiercest levels and, as such, escaped prosecution.
During 1996, Col de Kock was found guilty in the Supreme Court in Pretoria and was sentenced to life plus 80 years imprisonment for the five murders that took place at Nelspruit. In total he received two life sentences plus 212 years imprisonment on six other counts of murder (including that of Japie Maponya), various counts of attempted murder and other charges.
With the exception of the murders that took place at Nelspruit, the various amnesty committees found that all the other incidents were committed with a political objective and were, in fact, connected to the conflict of the past. He was refused amnesty on two of these counts as it was felt he had not made a full disclosure. Application for a revision of these cases would unquestionably have succeeded. However, even Adv Hattingh, who appeared on behalf of Col de Kock in all of his amnesty hearings, conceded that there was no possibility of a successful revision in the Nelspruit case. It would therefore not have benefited him to apply for a revision.
Sometimes the impression is created that Eugene de Kock is in a fix while the generals are scot-free - but this stems from ignorance of the facts. In the Nelspruit case, Col de Kock tried to implicate General Krappies Engelberecht but, during the criminal and amnesty hearings, conclusive evidence was presented to the effect that his assertions were unfounded.
In the Rapport of 10 January 2010, Jacques Pauw insisted, inter alia, that Gen Engelbrecht be brought to trial. It is not clear whether this stems from malice or from an inability to grasp the evidence given during the criminal and amnesty hearings.
There isn't a shred of evidence on which Gen Engelbrecht can be prosecuted and we challenge Mr Pauw to demonstrate on what grounds he believes Gen Engelbrecht could be charged.
There is no evidence whatsoever that any of the generals was implicated in any of the murders which Col de Kock was found guilty of. In the Maponya case General le Roux was still a colonel and was refused amnesty along with Col de Kock.
However, as Mr Malan ably demonstrated in his minority finding, amnesty was wrongly denied in the Maponya case. Mr Pauw and any of his like-minded colleagues can quite safely read Mr Malan’s finding and perhaps get someone with a legal background to explain it to them.
Apparently the principle of equality before the law had to give way before the harsh manner in which prosecution of former members of the Security Branch was insisted upon. As any advocate experienced in criminal law will confirm, on the basis of common purpose there exists, purely from what can be seen, damning evidence to prosecute all those members of the NEC who were not granted amnesty. It is striking, however, that no one seems to insist that equality before the law should be maintained.
Lately the possible pardoning of Col de Eugene de Kock has been severely criticised and persons, who presumably haven’t the vaguest idea what Afrikaner character is all about, loudly condemned the move on behalf of the Afrikaner. They have even less insight into the disgusting and objectionable conditions Col de Kock was exposed to during his career in the police.
On various occasions he was decorated with medals for gallantry. During the negotiation process the members of the Vlakplaas Unit became an embarrassment for Mr de Klerk and his cabinet who were more concerned about winning favour with the ANC at that stage. As a result they had to get rid of the unit. Members of the unit were treated like lepers and this undoubtedly caused much bitterness within their ranks.
While negotiations regarding amnesty were in progress and a general amnesty for all was being strongly considered, Judge Goldstone began to investigate cases against Col de Kock and other members of the Security Branch, which were associated with a political objective and committed in the conflict of the past. Gen Johan van der Merwe approached Mr de Klerk and objected to this and called for the investigation to be stopped - but. Mr de Klerk wouldn’t hear of it indicating that it would give the impression that he was trying to cover up the atrocities of the Security Branch.
Members of the South African Police were expressly forbidden by Mr de Klerk to investigate similar charges against members of the ANC. Had the principal of equality before the law been adhered to, and law and justice prevailed, the investigation of all such cases would have been put on hold until there was clarity surrounding the matter of amnesty. Had this been the case, Col de Kock would, without doubt, have received a lighter sentence because he could only have been prosecuted for the Nelspruit incident and on the theft charges. The judge would also have had the advantage of knowing material facts uncovered during the amnesty process, which would definitely have set the hearings in a different light.
In a letter to Rapport on 10 January 2010 Mr Koos van der Merwe, well known member of Parliament and one of the few remaining political leaders of the old dispensation who has the courage of his convictions and who has the backbone to state his case in public, said as follows:
Various members of the NEC were not in the country when these attacks were at their fiercest levels and, as such, escaped prosecution.
During 1996, Col de Kock was found guilty in the Supreme Court in Pretoria and was sentenced to life plus 80 years imprisonment for the five murders that took place at Nelspruit. In total he received two life sentences plus 212 years imprisonment on six other counts of murder (including that of Japie Maponya), various counts of attempted murder and other charges.
With the exception of the murders that took place at Nelspruit, the various amnesty committees found that all the other incidents were committed with a political objective and were, in fact, connected to the conflict of the past. He was refused amnesty on two of these counts as it was felt he had not made a full disclosure. Application for a revision of these cases would unquestionably have succeeded. However, even Adv Hattingh, who appeared on behalf of Col de Kock in all of his amnesty hearings, conceded that there was no possibility of a successful revision in the Nelspruit case. It would therefore not have benefited him to apply for a revision.
Sometimes the impression is created that Eugene de Kock is in a fix while the generals are scot-free - but this stems from ignorance of the facts. In the Nelspruit case, Col de Kock tried to implicate General Krappies Engelberecht but, during the criminal and amnesty hearings, conclusive evidence was presented to the effect that his assertions were unfounded.
In the Rapport of 10 January 2010, Jacques Pauw insisted, inter alia, that Gen Engelbrecht be brought to trial. It is not clear whether this stems from malice or from an inability to grasp the evidence given during the criminal and amnesty hearings.
There isn't a shred of evidence on which Gen Engelbrecht can be prosecuted and we challenge Mr Pauw to demonstrate on what grounds he believes Gen Engelbrecht could be charged.
There is no evidence whatsoever that any of the generals was implicated in any of the murders which Col de Kock was found guilty of. In the Maponya case General le Roux was still a colonel and was refused amnesty along with Col de Kock.
However, as Mr Malan ably demonstrated in his minority finding, amnesty was wrongly denied in the Maponya case. Mr Pauw and any of his like-minded colleagues can quite safely read Mr Malan’s finding and perhaps get someone with a legal background to explain it to them.
Apparently the principle of equality before the law had to give way before the harsh manner in which prosecution of former members of the Security Branch was insisted upon. As any advocate experienced in criminal law will confirm, on the basis of common purpose there exists, purely from what can be seen, damning evidence to prosecute all those members of the NEC who were not granted amnesty. It is striking, however, that no one seems to insist that equality before the law should be maintained.
Lately the possible pardoning of Col de Eugene de Kock has been severely criticised and persons, who presumably haven’t the vaguest idea what Afrikaner character is all about, loudly condemned the move on behalf of the Afrikaner. They have even less insight into the disgusting and objectionable conditions Col de Kock was exposed to during his career in the police.
On various occasions he was decorated with medals for gallantry. During the negotiation process the members of the Vlakplaas Unit became an embarrassment for Mr de Klerk and his cabinet who were more concerned about winning favour with the ANC at that stage. As a result they had to get rid of the unit. Members of the unit were treated like lepers and this undoubtedly caused much bitterness within their ranks.
While negotiations regarding amnesty were in progress and a general amnesty for all was being strongly considered, Judge Goldstone began to investigate cases against Col de Kock and other members of the Security Branch, which were associated with a political objective and committed in the conflict of the past. Gen Johan van der Merwe approached Mr de Klerk and objected to this and called for the investigation to be stopped - but. Mr de Klerk wouldn’t hear of it indicating that it would give the impression that he was trying to cover up the atrocities of the Security Branch.
Members of the South African Police were expressly forbidden by Mr de Klerk to investigate similar charges against members of the ANC. Had the principal of equality before the law been adhered to, and law and justice prevailed, the investigation of all such cases would have been put on hold until there was clarity surrounding the matter of amnesty. Had this been the case, Col de Kock would, without doubt, have received a lighter sentence because he could only have been prosecuted for the Nelspruit incident and on the theft charges. The judge would also have had the advantage of knowing material facts uncovered during the amnesty process, which would definitely have set the hearings in a different light.
In a letter to Rapport on 10 January 2010 Mr Koos van der Merwe, well known member of Parliament and one of the few remaining political leaders of the old dispensation who has the courage of his convictions and who has the backbone to state his case in public, said as follows:
EEN van die skokkendste terreurvoorvalle in die geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika het op 20 Mei 1983 plaasgevind. ʼn Motor met ʼn kragtige lading springstof het omstreeks vieruur die middag voor die Nedbankpleingebou in Kerkstraat, Pretoria, ontplof. (Die gebou het in Engels as die Nedbank Square Maritime House bekend gestaan.) Altesame 19 mense is dood, onder wie 12 burgerlikes en 7 Weermaglede. Altesame 219 mense is erg beseer of vermink, onder wie 217 burgerlikes en 2 Weermaglede.
Die hoofkwartier van die Suid-Afrikaanse Lugmag was op die eerste, tweede en derde verdiepings van die gebou. Die res van die dertien verdiepings is deur burgerlikes gebruik. Op die grondverdieping was ʼn kafee en ander sake-ondernemings.
Kol. Basie Smit (later generaal) en maj. Suiker Britz (later generaal) van die speurafdeling was in daardie stadium in Klub 34, nie ver van die ramptoneel af nie. Hulle het hulle na die toneel gehaas en was die eerste polisielede op die toneel. ʼn Afskuwelike gesig van dood en verwoesting het hulle begroet. Oral het lyke, erg beseerde of verminkte mense, ledemate, stukke verskroeide vlees, beendere en bebloede en verskeurde klere rondgelê. Voor die gebou was die wrak van ʼn motor met menslike oorblyfsels, vermoedelik die oorsprong van die ontploffing.
Lede van die taakmag en teeninsurgensie-eenheid onder bevel van genl. Bert Wandrag en die onlusbestrydingseenheid onder maj. Loots het die gebied dadelik afgekamp sodat moontlike bewysstukke nie versteur word nie.
Kundiges op verskillende terreine het dadelik aan die werk gespring: die Forensiese Wetenskaplaboratorium onder genl. Lothar Neethling het noukeurige opnames gedoen, die ingenieursafdeling van die Kwartiermeester het die motorwrakstukke ondersoek en plofstofkundiges het die toneel gefynkam om vas te stel watter en hoeveel springstof gebruik is. Alles is met video- en ander kameras op film vasgelê. Die Forensiese Wetenskaplaboratorium het later deur bloed- en weefseltoetse bepaal watter ledemate aan wie behoort en só kon die identiteit van die 19 oorledenes bepaal word.
By sy aankoms op die toneel het maj. Britz ’n lyk oorkant die pad regoor die motorwrak sien lê. Die man het vir hom bekend gelyk, maar hy kon nie onthou waar hy sy gesig al gesien het nie. Nadat hy op die ramptoneel gehelp het, het hy by sy huis lêers en foto’s van mense wat hy gearresteer het, nagegaan. Hy het op die foto van Ezekiel Maseko afgekom, wat hy jare tevore weens huisbraak, diefstal en gewapende roof aangekeer het. Maseko is aan al die aanklagte skuldig bevind en tot gevangenisstraf gevonnis. Dit was inderdaad hy wat oorkant die motorwrak gelê het.
Die volgende dag is ʼn ondersoekspan uit lede van die veiligheidstak, speurtak, moord-en-roofeenheid en die Forensiese Wetenskaplaboratorium saamgestel. Kapt. Frik Nel en lt. Hennie Britz van die veiligheidstak was deel van die ondersoekspan.
Inligting wat die verskillende eenhede ingewin het, is daagliks saamgevoeg om ʼn geheelbeeld van die voorval te kry. Kapt. Nel het deur ʼn informant vasgestel dat Maseko en Freddie Shongwe by die ontploffing betrokke was. Dit het die inligting van maj. Suiker Britz bevestig en hulle is na Maseko se huis in Mamelodi-Oos, waar hulle sy ma aangetref het. Volgens haar het Maseko haar vroeg die vorige dag gebel en gesê hy is per motor van Swaziland op pad na hul huis. Hy en ’n ander man het later met ʼn Colt Galant by die huis aangekom. Hulle het toe die enjinnommer van die motor met ʼn hoekslyper weggeskuur. Sy het die hoekslyper en die ystervysels aan hulle gewys. Lt. Hennie Britz het op die hoekslyper beslag gelê en dit as bewysstuk ingelewer. Maseko se ma het ook ʼn metaaltrommeltjie met R3 000 in kontant wat Maseko van Swaziland saamgebring het, aan hulle gegee.
Lede van die Forensiese Wetenskaplaboratorium het later die monsters van die ystervysels ontleed en vasgestel dat dit wel van die wrak kom wat die lading springstof bevat het.
Kapt. Nel en luit. Hennie Britz het vervolgens by Shongwe se ma navraag gedoen. Sy het oorblyfsels van haar seun se klere herken en só bevestig dat dit inderdaad Shongwe se verminkte lyk in die wrak van die Colt Galant was. Nes Maseko was Shongwe ʼn geharde misdadiger. Die wit Colt Galant waarin die bom ontplof het, is ongeveer ʼn jaar voor die voorval aan die Oos-Rand gesteel.
Daar is vasgestel dat Maseko en Shongwe met Maseko se Kombi na die middestad gery en toe met die Colt Galant na die Nedbankpleingebou gery het. ’n Soektog na die Kombi is dadelik op tou gesit, want as dit deel van die ontploffingsplan was, moes dit naby die toneel van ontploffing geparkeer gewees het. Twee lede van die veiligheidstak het toe wel die Kombi naby die ramptoneel opgespoor, op die sypaadjie by ʼn parkeerterrein op die hoek van Schubart- en Vermeulenstraat. In die Kombi was ʼn draagbare radio wat in ’n sender omgeskep is, asook springstof. Die sender het ʼn skakelaar gehad om die afstandbeheermeganisme te aktiveer. Oorblyfsels van die ontvangstoestel is in die wrak van die Colt Galant aangetref. Dit het ʼn ook skakelaar gehad om die afstandbeheermeganisme te aktiveer.
Daar word vermoed dat Shongwe die Colt Galant met die bom en ontvangstoestel in Kerkstraat voor die Nedbankpleingebou geparkeer het. Hy het daar bly sit terwyl Maseko die afstandbeheermeganisme deur middel van die sender in die Kombi gaan aktiveer het. Maseko het teruggekeer en aan die oorkant van die pad aan Shongwe die teken gegee dat dit gedoen is. Shongwe het die ontvangstoestel geaktiveer en die bom het onmiddellik ontplof. Blykbaar moes die ontvangstoestel in die Colt Galant eers geaktiveer gewees het en die sender in die Kombi later op die tyd waarop ooreengekom is.
Die MK-lid Johannes Mnisi het tydens die amnestieverhore amnestie gevra vir sy betrokkenheid by die grusame voorval. Mnisi is al in 1981 deur die veiligheidstak aangekeer, maar het ná sy arrestasie soveel waardevolle inligting verstrek dat besluit is om hom nie te vervolg nie. Hy is by die Vlakplaaseenheid as askari ingeskakel, waar hy aanvanklik sy volle samewerking verleen het. Sy broer is ook later gearresteer en as askari gebruik, maar die twee het later gevlug en hulle weer by die ANC geskaar. (Die woord “askari” kom in verskeie tale voor, onder meer Arabies en Swahili, en beteken “vegter”. In ons geval is die benaming gebruik vir lede van Umkhonto weSizwe en ander organisasies wat ons in hegtenis geneem en oorreed het om vir die veiligheidstak te werk.)
Mnisi het sy bevelvoerder, Aboobaker Ismail, gehelp om die afstandbeheermeganisme in Zambië te toets. Hy het ook Maseko en Shongwe, twee geharde misdadigers, gewerf en hulle is oor naweke in Swaziland as MK-lede opgelei. Die twee is ook geleer hoe om die afstandbeheermeganisme wat in die motorbom gebruik sou word, te hanteer. Klaarblyklik was die onderrig nie baie geslaag nie. Mnisi het die bom en ontvangstoestel in die Colt Galant geplaas en Helene Pastoors het die motor na Pretoria bestuur, waar sy dit op ʼn afgesproke plek gelaat het.
Die amnestiekomitee het die volgende in die geval van Pastoors bevind (die bevinding van die amnestiekomitee kan hier gelees word):
The Applicant was a member of the Special Operations Unit of Umkhonto weSizwe. During May 1983 she received instructions from her superior officer, one Aboobaker Ismail, to drive a motor vehicle which had been primed with explosives from Swaziland to a specified place in Pretoria. She drove the vehicle to Pretoria on 19 May 1983 and left it at the pre-arranged place as instructed. When she delivered the vehicle she did not know the target at which it would be used. She only learnt after the event that it was used in the car bomb operation outside the building in Church Street, Pretoria, which housed the Air Force headquarters.
We are satisfied that the Applicant has made a full disclosure of all relevant facts and that her actions in driving the vehicle to Pretoria were associated with a political objective. We are also satisfied that her application complies with the requirements of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No.34 of 1995.
The Applicant is accordingly GRANTED amnesty in respect of the unlawful delivery from Swaziland to Pretoria on 19 May 1983 of a motor vehicle which contained explosive material.
In die geval van die bevelvoerder, Aboobaker Ismail, het die amnestiekomitee soos volg bevind:
The Church Street bombing took place shortly after a parliamentary debate on the tricameral constitution and subsequent to the December 1982 SADF raid into Maseru in which a number of ANC supporters and Lesotho civilians were killed and the assassination of Ruth First in Maputo. The evidence before us is that the bombing was a planned operation. The target was selected subsequent to reconnaissance being carried out and the bomb was specifically constructed and infiltrated into the country for the operation. The stated objective of the operation was to carry out a highly visible attack on security force members which could not be covered up by the authorities. The operation was discussed at the highest level of Special Operations Command. It was considered that the target was overwhelmingly military and the question of civilian casualties was taken into account before arriving at the decision to proceed with the operation. Approval to go ahead with the operation was also obtained from Oliver Tambo, the President of the ANC.
We are satisfied that the bombing was an act associated with a political objective as envisaged by Section 20 of the Act and that it was not merely an act of anarchy or terrorism. The fact that the bombing took place before the Kabwe Conference does not mean that the target selection was against ANC policy. It was always the policy of MK to target security force personnel and, with regard to the civilian casualties, the operation was given prior approval by the highest authority in the ANC and the ANC acknowledged responsibility for the blast shortly after its occurrence. We are also of the view that the bombing was not racially motivated. The blast occurred in a busy public street and the civilian casualties included both blacks and whites. There was no possibility whatsoever in the circumstances of targeting a particular racial group.
The Applicant, Aboobaker Ismail, testified that at the time of the funeral after the Maseru massacre Oliver Tambo "had raised the issue that if the then government justified its action on the basis that civilians were killed because the ANC had set up bases amongst the civilian population, then would it also not be justified for the ANC to carry out operations against enemy headquarters and bases located within built-up areas". This, as well as the objective of carrying out a highly visible attack against military personnel which could not be covered up were, no doubt, factors taken into account in selecting the target. It was accepted by Special Operations Command that the blast, which would primarily be aimed at the military personnel who would gather at the bus stop immediately in front of the building which housed the SAAF Headquarters would also result in civilian casualties. The blast was an act of war which struck a severe blow at the ANC's enemy and which introduced a new phase of guerilla warfare in the struggle. Although the consequences of the blast were gruesome and tragic and affected many innocent civilians we, after careful consideration, are of the view that the manner of the execution of the operation was not disproportionate to the political objective pursued.
Dit is opvallend hoe uiters oppervlakkig die amnestiekomitee hierdie grusame voorval, die grootste terreurdaad in die geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika, gehanteer het. Daarteenoor is aansoeke deur lede van die veiligheidstak, waar enkele lede van Umkhonto weSizwe of politieke aktiviste om die lewe gebring is, gekenmerk deur uitgerekte amnestieverhore waar die WVK-ondersoekspan in sekere gevalle tot die uiterste toe gegaan het om die aansoekers as leuenaars aan die kaak te stel. Daar is 'n groot verskil tussen 'n militêre basis in Maseru en Kerkstraat, Pretoria wat hoofsaaklik deur burgerlikes wat nie by enige militêre of polities gemotiveerde handelinge betrokke is nie, gebruik word. Die volgende belangrike aspekte is nie deur die amnestiekomitee ondersoek of oorweeg nie:
Die hoofkwartier van die Suid-Afrikaanse Lugmag was op die eerste, tweede en derde verdiepings van die gebou. Die res van die dertien verdiepings is deur burgerlikes gebruik. Op die grondverdieping was ʼn kafee en ander sake-ondernemings.
Kol. Basie Smit (later generaal) en maj. Suiker Britz (later generaal) van die speurafdeling was in daardie stadium in Klub 34, nie ver van die ramptoneel af nie. Hulle het hulle na die toneel gehaas en was die eerste polisielede op die toneel. ʼn Afskuwelike gesig van dood en verwoesting het hulle begroet. Oral het lyke, erg beseerde of verminkte mense, ledemate, stukke verskroeide vlees, beendere en bebloede en verskeurde klere rondgelê. Voor die gebou was die wrak van ʼn motor met menslike oorblyfsels, vermoedelik die oorsprong van die ontploffing.
Lede van die taakmag en teeninsurgensie-eenheid onder bevel van genl. Bert Wandrag en die onlusbestrydingseenheid onder maj. Loots het die gebied dadelik afgekamp sodat moontlike bewysstukke nie versteur word nie.
Kundiges op verskillende terreine het dadelik aan die werk gespring: die Forensiese Wetenskaplaboratorium onder genl. Lothar Neethling het noukeurige opnames gedoen, die ingenieursafdeling van die Kwartiermeester het die motorwrakstukke ondersoek en plofstofkundiges het die toneel gefynkam om vas te stel watter en hoeveel springstof gebruik is. Alles is met video- en ander kameras op film vasgelê. Die Forensiese Wetenskaplaboratorium het later deur bloed- en weefseltoetse bepaal watter ledemate aan wie behoort en só kon die identiteit van die 19 oorledenes bepaal word.
By sy aankoms op die toneel het maj. Britz ’n lyk oorkant die pad regoor die motorwrak sien lê. Die man het vir hom bekend gelyk, maar hy kon nie onthou waar hy sy gesig al gesien het nie. Nadat hy op die ramptoneel gehelp het, het hy by sy huis lêers en foto’s van mense wat hy gearresteer het, nagegaan. Hy het op die foto van Ezekiel Maseko afgekom, wat hy jare tevore weens huisbraak, diefstal en gewapende roof aangekeer het. Maseko is aan al die aanklagte skuldig bevind en tot gevangenisstraf gevonnis. Dit was inderdaad hy wat oorkant die motorwrak gelê het.
Die volgende dag is ʼn ondersoekspan uit lede van die veiligheidstak, speurtak, moord-en-roofeenheid en die Forensiese Wetenskaplaboratorium saamgestel. Kapt. Frik Nel en lt. Hennie Britz van die veiligheidstak was deel van die ondersoekspan.
Inligting wat die verskillende eenhede ingewin het, is daagliks saamgevoeg om ʼn geheelbeeld van die voorval te kry. Kapt. Nel het deur ʼn informant vasgestel dat Maseko en Freddie Shongwe by die ontploffing betrokke was. Dit het die inligting van maj. Suiker Britz bevestig en hulle is na Maseko se huis in Mamelodi-Oos, waar hulle sy ma aangetref het. Volgens haar het Maseko haar vroeg die vorige dag gebel en gesê hy is per motor van Swaziland op pad na hul huis. Hy en ’n ander man het later met ʼn Colt Galant by die huis aangekom. Hulle het toe die enjinnommer van die motor met ʼn hoekslyper weggeskuur. Sy het die hoekslyper en die ystervysels aan hulle gewys. Lt. Hennie Britz het op die hoekslyper beslag gelê en dit as bewysstuk ingelewer. Maseko se ma het ook ʼn metaaltrommeltjie met R3 000 in kontant wat Maseko van Swaziland saamgebring het, aan hulle gegee.
Lede van die Forensiese Wetenskaplaboratorium het later die monsters van die ystervysels ontleed en vasgestel dat dit wel van die wrak kom wat die lading springstof bevat het.
Kapt. Nel en luit. Hennie Britz het vervolgens by Shongwe se ma navraag gedoen. Sy het oorblyfsels van haar seun se klere herken en só bevestig dat dit inderdaad Shongwe se verminkte lyk in die wrak van die Colt Galant was. Nes Maseko was Shongwe ʼn geharde misdadiger. Die wit Colt Galant waarin die bom ontplof het, is ongeveer ʼn jaar voor die voorval aan die Oos-Rand gesteel.
Daar is vasgestel dat Maseko en Shongwe met Maseko se Kombi na die middestad gery en toe met die Colt Galant na die Nedbankpleingebou gery het. ’n Soektog na die Kombi is dadelik op tou gesit, want as dit deel van die ontploffingsplan was, moes dit naby die toneel van ontploffing geparkeer gewees het. Twee lede van die veiligheidstak het toe wel die Kombi naby die ramptoneel opgespoor, op die sypaadjie by ʼn parkeerterrein op die hoek van Schubart- en Vermeulenstraat. In die Kombi was ʼn draagbare radio wat in ’n sender omgeskep is, asook springstof. Die sender het ʼn skakelaar gehad om die afstandbeheermeganisme te aktiveer. Oorblyfsels van die ontvangstoestel is in die wrak van die Colt Galant aangetref. Dit het ʼn ook skakelaar gehad om die afstandbeheermeganisme te aktiveer.
Daar word vermoed dat Shongwe die Colt Galant met die bom en ontvangstoestel in Kerkstraat voor die Nedbankpleingebou geparkeer het. Hy het daar bly sit terwyl Maseko die afstandbeheermeganisme deur middel van die sender in die Kombi gaan aktiveer het. Maseko het teruggekeer en aan die oorkant van die pad aan Shongwe die teken gegee dat dit gedoen is. Shongwe het die ontvangstoestel geaktiveer en die bom het onmiddellik ontplof. Blykbaar moes die ontvangstoestel in die Colt Galant eers geaktiveer gewees het en die sender in die Kombi later op die tyd waarop ooreengekom is.
Die MK-lid Johannes Mnisi het tydens die amnestieverhore amnestie gevra vir sy betrokkenheid by die grusame voorval. Mnisi is al in 1981 deur die veiligheidstak aangekeer, maar het ná sy arrestasie soveel waardevolle inligting verstrek dat besluit is om hom nie te vervolg nie. Hy is by die Vlakplaaseenheid as askari ingeskakel, waar hy aanvanklik sy volle samewerking verleen het. Sy broer is ook later gearresteer en as askari gebruik, maar die twee het later gevlug en hulle weer by die ANC geskaar. (Die woord “askari” kom in verskeie tale voor, onder meer Arabies en Swahili, en beteken “vegter”. In ons geval is die benaming gebruik vir lede van Umkhonto weSizwe en ander organisasies wat ons in hegtenis geneem en oorreed het om vir die veiligheidstak te werk.)
Mnisi het sy bevelvoerder, Aboobaker Ismail, gehelp om die afstandbeheermeganisme in Zambië te toets. Hy het ook Maseko en Shongwe, twee geharde misdadigers, gewerf en hulle is oor naweke in Swaziland as MK-lede opgelei. Die twee is ook geleer hoe om die afstandbeheermeganisme wat in die motorbom gebruik sou word, te hanteer. Klaarblyklik was die onderrig nie baie geslaag nie. Mnisi het die bom en ontvangstoestel in die Colt Galant geplaas en Helene Pastoors het die motor na Pretoria bestuur, waar sy dit op ʼn afgesproke plek gelaat het.
Die amnestiekomitee het die volgende in die geval van Pastoors bevind (die bevinding van die amnestiekomitee kan hier gelees word):
The Applicant was a member of the Special Operations Unit of Umkhonto weSizwe. During May 1983 she received instructions from her superior officer, one Aboobaker Ismail, to drive a motor vehicle which had been primed with explosives from Swaziland to a specified place in Pretoria. She drove the vehicle to Pretoria on 19 May 1983 and left it at the pre-arranged place as instructed. When she delivered the vehicle she did not know the target at which it would be used. She only learnt after the event that it was used in the car bomb operation outside the building in Church Street, Pretoria, which housed the Air Force headquarters.
We are satisfied that the Applicant has made a full disclosure of all relevant facts and that her actions in driving the vehicle to Pretoria were associated with a political objective. We are also satisfied that her application complies with the requirements of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No.34 of 1995.
The Applicant is accordingly GRANTED amnesty in respect of the unlawful delivery from Swaziland to Pretoria on 19 May 1983 of a motor vehicle which contained explosive material.
In die geval van die bevelvoerder, Aboobaker Ismail, het die amnestiekomitee soos volg bevind:
The Church Street bombing took place shortly after a parliamentary debate on the tricameral constitution and subsequent to the December 1982 SADF raid into Maseru in which a number of ANC supporters and Lesotho civilians were killed and the assassination of Ruth First in Maputo. The evidence before us is that the bombing was a planned operation. The target was selected subsequent to reconnaissance being carried out and the bomb was specifically constructed and infiltrated into the country for the operation. The stated objective of the operation was to carry out a highly visible attack on security force members which could not be covered up by the authorities. The operation was discussed at the highest level of Special Operations Command. It was considered that the target was overwhelmingly military and the question of civilian casualties was taken into account before arriving at the decision to proceed with the operation. Approval to go ahead with the operation was also obtained from Oliver Tambo, the President of the ANC.
We are satisfied that the bombing was an act associated with a political objective as envisaged by Section 20 of the Act and that it was not merely an act of anarchy or terrorism. The fact that the bombing took place before the Kabwe Conference does not mean that the target selection was against ANC policy. It was always the policy of MK to target security force personnel and, with regard to the civilian casualties, the operation was given prior approval by the highest authority in the ANC and the ANC acknowledged responsibility for the blast shortly after its occurrence. We are also of the view that the bombing was not racially motivated. The blast occurred in a busy public street and the civilian casualties included both blacks and whites. There was no possibility whatsoever in the circumstances of targeting a particular racial group.
The Applicant, Aboobaker Ismail, testified that at the time of the funeral after the Maseru massacre Oliver Tambo "had raised the issue that if the then government justified its action on the basis that civilians were killed because the ANC had set up bases amongst the civilian population, then would it also not be justified for the ANC to carry out operations against enemy headquarters and bases located within built-up areas". This, as well as the objective of carrying out a highly visible attack against military personnel which could not be covered up were, no doubt, factors taken into account in selecting the target. It was accepted by Special Operations Command that the blast, which would primarily be aimed at the military personnel who would gather at the bus stop immediately in front of the building which housed the SAAF Headquarters would also result in civilian casualties. The blast was an act of war which struck a severe blow at the ANC's enemy and which introduced a new phase of guerilla warfare in the struggle. Although the consequences of the blast were gruesome and tragic and affected many innocent civilians we, after careful consideration, are of the view that the manner of the execution of the operation was not disproportionate to the political objective pursued.
Dit is opvallend hoe uiters oppervlakkig die amnestiekomitee hierdie grusame voorval, die grootste terreurdaad in die geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika, gehanteer het. Daarteenoor is aansoeke deur lede van die veiligheidstak, waar enkele lede van Umkhonto weSizwe of politieke aktiviste om die lewe gebring is, gekenmerk deur uitgerekte amnestieverhore waar die WVK-ondersoekspan in sekere gevalle tot die uiterste toe gegaan het om die aansoekers as leuenaars aan die kaak te stel. Daar is 'n groot verskil tussen 'n militêre basis in Maseru en Kerkstraat, Pretoria wat hoofsaaklik deur burgerlikes wat nie by enige militêre of polities gemotiveerde handelinge betrokke is nie, gebruik word. Die volgende belangrike aspekte is nie deur die amnestiekomitee ondersoek of oorweeg nie:
- Wie het in die spesiale bevelstruktuur (Special Operations Command) van die ANC/SAKP-alliansie gedien? Hulle is almal aan moord skuldig op grond van die beginsel van gemeenskaplike opset wat in ons reg bestaan.
- Die voorval was 'n ernstige oortreding van die protokol van die Geneefse Konvensie wat bepaal dat burgerlikes nie aangeval mag word nie.
- Nie een van die lede van die streek politieke-militêre raad (Regional Politico Military Council) (RPMC) het getuig om die weergawe van mnr Aboobaker Ismael te bevestig nie.
- Die senior bevelstruktuur in die ANC is gedurende 1983 deur die streek politieke-militêre rade (Regional Politico Military Councils) (RPMCs), vervang en het ook die gesag en verantwoordelikheid gekry om oor operasionele optredes te besluit. Dit was die taak van die RPMC’s om die politieke en militêre bedrywighede in hulle streke te koördineer en onderhewig aan die beleid van die ANC/SAKP-alliansie en die politieke-militêre raad te magtig. Alle persone wat n hierdie strukture gedien het, is skuldig aan moord,
- ’n Totaal van 19 mense is dood, insluitende 12 burgerlikes en sewe weermaglede. 'n Totaal van 219 mense is ernstig beseer of vermink, insluitend 217 burgerlikes en twee weermag lede. Die voorval het gedurende spitstyd in Kerkstraat wat meestal deur burgerlikes, insluitende vroue en kinders gebruik word. Nedbank Square Maritime Huis bestaan uit 13 vloere en slegs die eerste drie vloere is deur die lugmag gebruik. Hierdie feite is nie in die bevinding van die amnestiekomitee genoem nie en daar is geen aanduiding op watter gronde die volgende gevolgtrekking van die amnestiekomitee gebaseer nie:
"Die ontploffing was 'n daad van oorlog wat 'n wat die teëstanders van die ANC ‘n gevoelige slag toegedien het en wat 'n nuwe fase in guerrilla- oorlogvoering in die stryd ingelui het. Alhoewel die gevolge van die ontploffing grusame en tragiese gevolge gehad het en baie onskuldige burgerlikes se lewens beïnvloed het, is ons, na deeglike oorweging, van mening dat die wyse waarop die operasie uitgevoer is, in verhouding met die politieke doelwit wat nagestreef is, was”
Ingevolge internasionale reg word terrorisme omskryf as die berekende gebruik van onwettige geweld of die dreigemente van onwettige geweld om vrees af te dwing of te intimideer om regerings of lede van die samelewings in ‘n bepaalde rigting te dwing in die nastrewing van doelwitte wat algemeen van politieke, godsdienstige of ideologiese aard is.
Guerrilla-oorlogvoering is 'n vorm van nie-konvensionele oorlogvoering waarin 'n klein groepie vegters soos paramilitêre personeel of gewapende burgerlikes deur gebruik van militêre taktiek insluitend hinderlae, sabotasie, strooptogte, kleinskaalse oorlogvoering, tref-en-trap-taktiek, en beweeglikheid ‘n groter en minder beweeglike tradisionele militêre mag aanval.
Dit is duidelik dat die amnestiekomitee nie die vaagste benul gehad het guerrilla-oorlogvoering behels het nie.
Die nasionale uitvoerende komitee (NUK) van die ANC/SAKP-alliansie gedurende die tydperk 1983-1985 het uit die volgende persone bestaan:
President: OR Tambo
Tesourier: Thomas Nkobi
Sekretaris-generaal: Alfred Nzo
Administratiewe sekretaris van die NUK: Joe Nhlanhla.
Ander lede: Mzwai Piliso, Moses Mabhida, Joe Modise, Joe Jele, John Motshabi, Andrew Masondo, Robert Manci, Joe Gqabi, Jacob Zuma, Steve Dlamini, John Nkadimeng, Simon Makana, Gertrude Shope, Florence Moposho, Chris Hani, Thabo Mbeki, Johnny Makathini.
Die politieke-militêre Raad (PMC) gedurende dieselfde tydperk het bestaan uit:
Voorsitter: OR Tambo
Tesourier: Reginald September
Die Sekretaris van die PMC was Joe Nhlanhla, tot 1987
Roete MHQ verteenwoordigers op die PMC: Joe Modise, Joe Slovo, Chris Hani.
PHQ verteenwoordigers op die PMC: Joe Jele, Mac Maharaj, Jacob Zuma, John Motshabi, Ruth Mompati
NAT verteenwoordiger op die PMC: Mzwai Piliso
Ander lede ingesluit: Alfred Nzo, t.t. Nkobi, Job Tlhabane ( "Cassius Maak"), Sizakele Sigxashe, Andrew Masondo, Moses Mabhida, John Nkadimeng.
Hoewel die meeste van hierdie persone reeds gesterf het, kan persone soos mnre. Jacob Zuma, Thabo Mbeki en Mac Maharaj wat nie om amnestie vir die Kerkstraatbomvoorval gevra het nie, volgens die beginsel van gemeenskaplike opset vir moord vervolg word soos in ons reg bepaal word. Mnr Aboobaker Ismael en al die ander MK-lede aan amnestie toegestaan is, kan ingevolge die Strafproseswet verplig word om teen hulle te getuig. Daar is gevolglik meer as afdoende getuienis beskikbaar om hulle te vervolg. Desondanks het die nasionale vervolgingsgesag nog niks in hierdie verband gedoen nie en is daar ook geen aanduidings van so 'n voorneme nie . In skrille kontras daarmee is verskeie leiers, generaals en lede van die vorige regering en veiligheidsmagte, weens misdade wat met ‘n politieke oogmerk verband hou en in die konflik van die verlede gepleeg is, vervolg.
Guerrilla-oorlogvoering is 'n vorm van nie-konvensionele oorlogvoering waarin 'n klein groepie vegters soos paramilitêre personeel of gewapende burgerlikes deur gebruik van militêre taktiek insluitend hinderlae, sabotasie, strooptogte, kleinskaalse oorlogvoering, tref-en-trap-taktiek, en beweeglikheid ‘n groter en minder beweeglike tradisionele militêre mag aanval.
Dit is duidelik dat die amnestiekomitee nie die vaagste benul gehad het guerrilla-oorlogvoering behels het nie.
Die nasionale uitvoerende komitee (NUK) van die ANC/SAKP-alliansie gedurende die tydperk 1983-1985 het uit die volgende persone bestaan:
President: OR Tambo
Tesourier: Thomas Nkobi
Sekretaris-generaal: Alfred Nzo
Administratiewe sekretaris van die NUK: Joe Nhlanhla.
Ander lede: Mzwai Piliso, Moses Mabhida, Joe Modise, Joe Jele, John Motshabi, Andrew Masondo, Robert Manci, Joe Gqabi, Jacob Zuma, Steve Dlamini, John Nkadimeng, Simon Makana, Gertrude Shope, Florence Moposho, Chris Hani, Thabo Mbeki, Johnny Makathini.
Die politieke-militêre Raad (PMC) gedurende dieselfde tydperk het bestaan uit:
Voorsitter: OR Tambo
Tesourier: Reginald September
Die Sekretaris van die PMC was Joe Nhlanhla, tot 1987
Roete MHQ verteenwoordigers op die PMC: Joe Modise, Joe Slovo, Chris Hani.
PHQ verteenwoordigers op die PMC: Joe Jele, Mac Maharaj, Jacob Zuma, John Motshabi, Ruth Mompati
NAT verteenwoordiger op die PMC: Mzwai Piliso
Ander lede ingesluit: Alfred Nzo, t.t. Nkobi, Job Tlhabane ( "Cassius Maak"), Sizakele Sigxashe, Andrew Masondo, Moses Mabhida, John Nkadimeng.
Hoewel die meeste van hierdie persone reeds gesterf het, kan persone soos mnre. Jacob Zuma, Thabo Mbeki en Mac Maharaj wat nie om amnestie vir die Kerkstraatbomvoorval gevra het nie, volgens die beginsel van gemeenskaplike opset vir moord vervolg word soos in ons reg bepaal word. Mnr Aboobaker Ismael en al die ander MK-lede aan amnestie toegestaan is, kan ingevolge die Strafproseswet verplig word om teen hulle te getuig. Daar is gevolglik meer as afdoende getuienis beskikbaar om hulle te vervolg. Desondanks het die nasionale vervolgingsgesag nog niks in hierdie verband gedoen nie en is daar ook geen aanduidings van so 'n voorneme nie . In skrille kontras daarmee is verskeie leiers, generaals en lede van die vorige regering en veiligheidsmagte, weens misdade wat met ‘n politieke oogmerk verband hou en in die konflik van die verlede gepleeg is, vervolg.
Verwante inhoud:
SEARCH THIS WEBSITE
EXPLORE CATEGORIES
