

## ACTUALITY ANALYSIS: UNDERSTANDING THE ZUMA RIOTS

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**1. OBJECTIVE:** This analysis has as goal to help readers of **NONGQAI** have a better holistic understanding of what really has been happening in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, and why, since the incarceration of ex-president Jacob Zuma (i.e., going beyond the uncoordinated jumble of imagery and event reporting that the media, by their nature, have been carrying). Our assessment aims to reveal the real goals of the parties involved, plus their respective strategies and tactics, as well as the utmost seriousness of the situation – but also the silver linings and statesmanship that undoubtedly are present as well. In conclusion, we will comment on what this may bode for the future (in brief: what has been happening is indeed shocking, but in fact it is also reason for hope and optimism, since it potentially represents a turning point in the decades-old ideological struggle within the ruling ANC).

*NB: this assessment is based purely on information available in the public domain since we at **NONGQAI** obviously are not privy to the confidential intelligence undoubtedly at the disposal of President Cyril Ramaphosa and his government.*

**2. THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT:** There are two main participants in the current unrest situation, being:

- The Zuma clique within the ANC (i.e., the so-called RET – *Radical Economic Transformation* faction committed to consummating a second revolution, being the NDR or *National Democratic Revolution*); and
- the more moderate Ramaphosa (ruling) group within the ANC, which wants to maintain the rule of law in a constitutional state on a non-racial basis, with a free-market economy and without tribal domination.

In that sense, this therefore may appear to be an intra-party ANC factional power struggle. But because it involves other groups and the state itself, it is so much more than just that.

There are three other groupings that have an interest/involvement in the current situation in KZN and GT, being:

- the Zulu nation;
- opportunistic criminal elements; and (last but by no means least)
- the rest of South Africa's population (individually as affected victims, and as organized community groups, such as the taxi association, community policing forums and neighbourhood watches).



### 3. WHAT HAS BEEN HAPPENING IN KZN & GT?

On 29 June 2021, the Constitutional Court sentenced ex-pres. Jacob Zuma to 15 months imprisonment for contempt of a court order to appear before the commission of enquiry into state capture corruption. At the last minute on 7 July, he handed himself over to police, and was incarcerated at Estcourt in the KZN Midlands. On 9 July, the High Court in Pietermaritzburg refused to grant an application by Zuma to have his incarceration for contempt stayed. On the same day, massive unrest erupted in KZN and GT, ostensibly as public protest against the jailing of Zuma.

The “protest” action did not, however, consist of typical protest activities such as marching and showing of placards. Instead, from the outset it erupted violently, with evident instigation and the strategic targeting of key infrastructure such as the N3 Durban-Johannesburg highway, and the road network in general (because of which 113 telecoms towers went off air, through lack of fuel and maintenance), as well as warehouses, shopping malls and shops, with liquor stores being prominent among the latter. A frenzy of looting indeed ensued, but unlike the recent wave of Black Lives Matter protest in the USA and elsewhere (which had also often included an element of looting), the destruction in KZN and GT did not end at carrying off the contents – it was deliberately and extensively followed up by setting fire to the buildings and goods vehicles looted, so as to cause maximum damage and economic loss. This is underscored by 139 schools having been attacked and damaged in KZN – with schools not typically being good hunting grounds for looters. Of particular concern was the “looting” of a specific container loaded with 1.5 million rounds of ammunition from the port, and its rapid distribution then across KZN.

There were also concerted efforts to instigate racial tensions, such as circulating an entirely false rumour on social media that Indian South Africans from Phoenix (north of Durban) had murdered 11 Zulu youths, who should be avenged (in KZN the bloody Zulu-on-Indian pogrom of 1949 is still an indelible part of collective memory).

The unrest, most fortunately, did not spread beyond KZN and GT, the parts of the country with strong Zulu demographic presence as can be seen from the two maps below, showing the unrest and Zulu distribution (**News24** unrest hotspot map).



Reports have emerged that the unrest had been deliberately instigated and orchestrated, and that it was planned to be executed in phases, with the looting and burning being phase one (aimed particularly at interrupting food supply), allegedly to be followed up by attacks against critical infrastructure such as water works and reservoirs and the port of Durban (through which much of South Africa's exports flow, but which critically also receives the grain imports necessary for the baking of bread; significantly, the country's main producer of yeast for the baking industry, located in Durban, was one of the first to be targeted for destruction, even though looting yeast would not seem a very profitable investment of time for looters...).

When (in a later section) we will look at the strategic goals and the tactics of the opposing factions, we will return to assessing whether the events from 9 to 17 July should be typified as democratic public political protest, or something far more sinister. It will suffice to point out here the enormous scope of the damage caused: a survey by organized agriculture & business in KZN, as reported on 20 July, avers that in more than 55% of towns in KZN "economic activity has been completely destroyed", with a further 15% suffering destruction of economic activity of between 40%-80%, and another 15% of towns having suffered damage of between 11% and 40%. More than 64% of towns are facing "severe" food shortages, and another 32% "moderate" food shortages. According to the presidency, 150, 000 jobs have been lost. A 3% contraction in the national economy is predicted for the 3<sup>rd</sup> quarter, and in the greater Durban region alone, damage to property is estimated to run to ZAR15 billion, with a further ZAR1.5billion in stock losses. Worst of all, is the number of deaths, which provisionally stand at 276 (as on 21 July).

4. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: The internal ideological struggle within the ANC goes back many decades. Since 1994, this internal struggle has been playing out in democratic manner, within South Africa's constitutional framework, as well as the internal constitution of the ANC as such – that is, till the 2<sup>nd</sup> week of July 2021.

The RSA constitution, based on the British model, is framed to permit the largest party in parliament to designate the president (who, in other words, is not directly elected by the general public). This means that the intra-party faction that gains a majority within the largest party (currently the ANC) will effectively appoint the president of the country (i.e., the ANC national conferences therefore not only elect the party leader, but actually anoints the next South African president). It must thus be understood that the current power struggle within the ANC can't be seen as being merely a factional intra-party tiff. Because of the nature of our 1996 national constitution, the intra-ANC struggle determines who will hold national political power, over all South Africans. The current situation can hardly, therefore, be more serious, or for bigger stakes...

As said, the current conflict within the ANC goes back a long way. It remains illustrative of, as well as being representative of the two main factions that had already become visible with the breakaway of the PAC in the fifties – those who favour a revolutionary power takeover and radical economic transformation of the state (with Zuma as figurehead), versus the "non-racial", less radical group (at one time headed by Nobel Peace Laureate Chief Albert Luthuli; now by Pres. Cyril

Ramaphosa). During the eighties, this conflict had crystallized into what became known within the then intelligence community as the London faction (Thabo Mbeki, plus the other negotiation minded – on whose side Nelson Mandela effectively positioned himself) vs. the Lusaka faction of Chris Hani and Mac Maharaj, who then and still today aim at a revolutionary takeover of the state (*vide* Operation Vula and the slogan: power grows from the barrel of the gun) to be followed by radical transformation of the economy.

During the democratic transition of the early 1990s, the negotiators under Mandela / Mbeki / Ramaphosa had the upper hand and Jacob Zuma – always a political weather-cock – had ostensibly joined them, although he was actually from the Lusaka Group.

What the "Vula/RET faction" had learnt from the history of the PAC's breakaway and subsequent irrelevance (as more recently reaffirmed by Julius Malema's breakaway from the ANC with his EFF, and their subsequent electoral marginalization) is that breaking away from the ANC is not the path to power, but to the political wilderness – in order to gain national power, the ANC must be taken over from within, allowing the ANC majority to serve in Parliament as driver for taking over the authority in the country.

Thabo Mbeki's fall as ANC leader was planned in the main by Mac Maharaj, the brains of the Lusaka group. This he managed to achieve by winning the internal battle for delegate votes in the ANC's national leadership race of December 2007, through setting up a Zulu (in the person of Zuma) as figurehead for their faction, and mobilizing the demographic weight of the Zulu (*i.a.* through diligent branch formation during the run-up in particularly KZN, but also in areas where there is a strong Zulu presence, such as Gauteng, NE-Free State and the eastern parts of the former Transvaal province). This faction euphemistically used the banner of carrying through a *National Democratic Revolution* (NDR) for their renewed fuelling of radical economic policy – thus very much on the pattern of the classic communist "second revolution" which should then bring them the promised land. To them, the "first revolution" in 1994 had served merely to bring about the fall of the old order (so that, in their view, the 1994 settlement and the constitution that flowed from it, was not cast in concrete as a lasting constitutional and economic dispensation). The 2007 ANC leadership race was heated: credible information had circulated at the time of the Zuma faction having gathered a few hundred armed cadres in Mozambique near the KZN border, ready to intervene (if needed) in the manner earlier foreseen *i.t.o.* Operation Vula.

After his ascension to the presidency in May 2009, Zuma began leveraging his newfound position to strengthen and consolidate his power base within KZN (practically eliminating Inkatha as a relevant political force). At the same time, he began to allow himself to be drawn into the personal enrichment schemes of his immediate clique, especially in collaboration with the Gupta brothers. When the public spotlight began to fall negatively on this, a leading London publicity agency, Bell Pottinger, was contracted to develop for Zuma/the Guptas a psychological counter-strategy: a political positioning/marketing that accused their opponents of

being lackeys of “White Monopoly Capital” (WMC), targeting especially the more unsophisticated ranks with this message. This psychological action tried to absolve Zuma and his cronies by averring that Whites simply do not want to allow Blacks to become rich as well (which, supposedly, was why Zuma’s blatant facilitation of state capture corruption was being objected against by his opponents and in the media, who are “all in the pockets of the WMC”).

Furthermore, it was alleged to the masses in this Bell Pottinger psychological strategy, that the WMC is particularly keen on getting rid of Zuma, since he was favouring the completion of a *National Democratic Revolution* in the quest to allow the still poor and exploited black masses the benefits *Radical Economic Transformation* (which would strip the WMC of their ill-gotten gains). Zuma was supposedly also not acceptable to the WMC and their lackeys because he was proudly a Zulu traditionalist, not emulating White norms and insisting on respect for the Zulu as the principal tribe of South Africa.

In essence, however, this NDR/RET battle against the “WMC” remains nothing else than the decades-old yearning within the ANC's radical wing to achieve a total take-over of power in the country, also of the economy, on the revolutionary model of a “*people's republic*” (thus unobstructed by the constraints imposed by the negotiated constitution and the rule of law).

The leadership battle within the ANC in 2017 to choose Zuma's successor was also projected by the NDR/RET faction as a fight against the evil WMC and its supposedly bought & paid for lackeys (since they believed that WMC was underhandedly funding Ramaphosa's faction). As undertone to this ideological positioning, there was the quiet tribal mobilization to retain Zulu hegemony (their candidate was Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, a fellow KZN-born Zulu and the ex-wife of Jacob Zuma).

On the side of the Ramaphosa faction, however (in addition to grave concern about what Zuma’s blatant corruption was doing to the image of the ANC, as well as worry about the consequences of his avowedly radical positions on the economy), it was precisely this ancestral fear among South Africa’s other tribes for Zulu domination (dating from the time of Shaka Zulu and the Mfecane massacres) that most militated in his favour. In Africa it is common that, where there is a domineering tribe in a country, the other tribes team up and choose the leader of the smallest tribe as president (Ramaphosa is a Venda, our smallest tribe by far), in order to ensure that the leader does not have a strong own tribal power base. It is history that Ramaphosa won by a nose (having gained only 51.9%, after much in-fighting in the courts to unseat certain delegates and deny them voting rights by not accrediting them). It is a fact that his power base was very shaky from the start and has remained so ever since.

This, then, as the broad backdrop against which the current crisis plays out: what, however, are the strategic considerations and goals in play here? What are the tactics of the Zuma side, in instigating the current unrest? What, on the other hand, are the most important tactical considerations for the Ramaphosa government?

**5. STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS:** Talking strategically, on both sides the current struggle is above all about the political power within the ANC, and from that base, within the country as a whole. This struggle for power revolves around two central strategic considerations: what ideology should be favoured on especially the economy (thus still a continuation of the decades-old ideological struggle within the ANC) plus then the more recent issue of whether the Zulu should be allowed to play a defining role in the ANC, and by extension, in the affairs of the country. On the Zuma side, there is a third important personal consideration: if they can re-gain political power, then they can make the legal sword of criminal prosecutions hanging over them, go away (and most likely start dipping again into the trough of a statist rent economy).

Strategically, therefore, the stakes are huge – from the Zuma faction's side, nothing less than a take-over of power aimed at (re)establishing their control under Zulu hegemony, facilitating a radical takeover of the economy (the old "scientific-socialism" dream of a *"people's republic"* serving the power elites, justified under the guise of the NDR/RET), plus escaping from the threat of criminal prosecution.

**Tactically** seen, the situation is more complex, because of the personal considerations also at play. Zuma and many within his clique were already confronted with the personal threat of serious prison time for the corruption that had flourished under his watch. Any criminal justice system functions on the basis of attaching a cost to criminal behaviour (a cost such as incarceration) to serve as a deterrent from doing wrong. What the Zuma clique are now attempting to do, is to apply that exact same principle of deterrence, but only in reverse – they want to attach a very heavy cost to any legal action taken against them, in order to deter the state from prosecuting/locking up any of them (they are especially targeting the interests of the "WMC", in order to hurt them so much that they should "instruct" Ramaphosa (whose strings the WMC allegedly pull) to leave Zuma and his fellows alone, because legal action against them is costing the WMC too much.

Secondly, within the context of the internal struggle for power in the ANC/ the state, the radical clique also wants to make clear to the public at large (by means of the typical terrorist tactic of resorting to violent intimidation and destruction) that there will not be peace unless the radicals are given their way. Their hope, with this tactic, is that the middle ground within the ANC will surrender against this form of blackmail and again give the radicals the power, for the sake of peace.

Given the radical roots of the Zuma faction in the revolutionary wars of national liberation during the Cold War, and their push for a National Democratic Revolution to supplant the current constitutional order, it is clear that they feel no particular allegiance to the concept of the rule of law and to the democratic, constitutionally-constrained pursuit of political power – it would thus be naïve in the extreme to believe that, given their history with Operation Vula and the like, that they would refrain from using violence, including extreme violence, as a means to achieve their political ends, especially when feeling themselves personally under threat.

Considering now what we have seen actually transpire in KZN and GT, and assessing these actions against the backdrop of the tactical considerations just

outlined, it is self-evident that the massive, strategically targeted destruction that has been instigated and orchestrated, cannot conceivably be deemed to have been merely legitimate political protest born out of frustration induced by poverty, by the hardships caused by the pandemic and by any perceived slight of their man and their tribe (in the form of the incarceration of Zuma).

Firstly, there were no overt signs of typical protest – no marching, no placards, no statements. People were bussed to strategic targets and, yes, there was looting on massive scale, but then it went further, to deliberate and massive destruction in the form of burning down infrastructure and fixed property, to a value ten times exceeding that of the goods looted. The targeting as such (cutting the highway and roads network, attacking 139 schools) point to a deliberate strategy to cause economic pain and social disruption, in order to try and extra-legally achieve political goals that could not be achieved constitutionally and democratically. This, by any definition, is not protest, but is **insurrection** – as Pres. Ramaphosa has rightfully been pointing out.

Tactically, the Zuma faction has been trying to use the revolutionary playbook of the seventies and eighties, which is based on subverting the existing power by means of mobilising the masses to make the country ungovernable. In order to mobilise the masses, the first necessary step is to conscientize, then to polarize, radicalize and finally mobilise into an irresistible force. The conscientization (message implantation) in the Zulu ambit has evidently been thorough, given the numbers who participated in the destruction – but still, far from complete (important leadership elements such as the Zulu royal house, the taxi association and Zulu politicians who have remained loyal to the constitutional order, shows that, despite the numbers of those who did participate in looting and destruction, the Zuma gambit of a popular uprising had failed, even in KZN and GT.)

What the Zuma faction had needed in order to advance from conscientization phase to polarization and full mobilisation, also in the rest of South Africa, was to trap the Ramaphosa government into a violent response to the looting. The revolutionary playbook had shown that nothing alienates and polarizes so effectively as heavy-handed security force action that's not properly planned, adequately logistically supported or commanded and controlled with politically-sensitive discretion (as the then security forces' disastrous handling of the June 16 protest in Soweto, for example, more than amply demonstrated). The recent looting and destruction was therefore provocative in the extreme, **set precisely as a trap** (in any other nation on the planet, including in the West, destruction on such a scale, with such deliberate strategic targeting, would very likely have elicited a massive security response from government, using legitimate force – but then losing the political battle for the hearts and minds of those who had lost sons, daughters, relatives and friends in the riots).

So, the tactical scenarios that the Zuma clique probably had gamed out in their minds, revolved around two likely outcomes they anticipated, either of which would have represented a win for them: They probably reasoned that, if they could instigate violent destruction and economic damage at the scale they in fact achieved, then the government would have no choice but to try and stop it, one way or the

other. This would have been through either a deployment of force (which would have needed to be massive and oppressive, given the sheer scale of the challenge) igniting a spiralling cycle of alienation, polarisation, and mobilization, because it would be Ramaphosa's security forces shooting Zulus, Blacks, in order to protect the property of Whites and Indians. The only other possible way that the Zuma clique likely believed the government could stem the violence without setting the security forces on the looters, would have been to release Zuma and plead for calm.

The ideal phase one outcome for the Zuma group would have been if the government had chosen to forcefully contribute to an escalation of the violence, by pall-mall deploying the unprepared and under-equipped security forces and ordering them to suppress the unrest by force, without adequate intelligence, planning or numbers. The trap was set, the provocation instigated, and such forceful attempted immediate suppression would thus almost inevitably have escalated the spiral of alienation, radicalization and polarization to the point of eventually probably engulfing the entire country and pitting races and tribes against one another, leading to ungovernability and a rejection of the thus failed Ramaphosa government. Should such a spiral of violence, on the other hand, have led to Zuma being released (as a placatory measure to try and re-establish peace), then that would have been a clear political victory for the Zuma faction, which also would have shown that Ramaphosa had lost control and the ability to govern. That outcome would then inevitably result in a transfer of power back to his challengers.

Tactically, should the phase one destruction not have sufficed to force the government's hand into releasing Zuma and capitulating to his faction, then it appears now from reporting that a phase two may have been planned, targeting critical infrastructure such as communications, water works and the port. Together with the food shortages that undoubtedly already will be following the massive phase one destruction and road blockages, this would have been intended to shortly result in a population desperate for basic necessities, and again blaming the government for not being able to provide it, nor security. Again, these are the tactics of violent revolutionary warfare, of an insurrection, not of legitimate political protest.

**Tactically, the Ramaphosa government**, on their part, was obviously driven first by their desire to retain their legitimately won power within the ANC, and therefore the State. To do this, they had to engage in a delicate balancing act, leveraging four things:

- firstly (subtly) letting play out the historical fear that the other tribes have, from Shaka's time, for violent Zulu domination.
- Secondly, relying on the build-up of public revulsion in the now visibly disastrous consequences of the RET group's radical, reckless approach concerning the economy and around the use of violence for political ends.
- Thirdly, deploying first of all to protect the truly critical infrastructure from destruction – essentials such as water works and the port, the destruction of which could have led to long-term deprivation of basic services, leaving the population desperate for elemental necessities such as water and food for an



extended period, which would then signify that the government had lost the power to govern and polarize communities against one another.

- Fourthly, they had to have the active engagement of the public, relying on the innate values and conservatism of the average South African who abhors violence and destruction and craves law and order; above all, the government had to retain the goodwill of the majority of the populace by being seen as restrained and rational, thus emerging as the “good guys” in the struggle for the hearts and minds.

In short, the government had to allow the RET/Zuma faction the rope to, through their attempted insurrection, make themselves to be publicly identified with the chaos, damage, loss of life and the very trying circumstances that inevitably will flow from the unrest, whilst as government positioning themselves as the democratically rightful, rational, responsible and peace-orientated faction, with as sub-text also them being the bulwark against radical political and economic experimentation, Zulu domination and rampant criminality.

For these wedge points to properly drive in, it was thus, paradoxically, to Ramaphosa's benefit that the violent destruction initially continued unbridled. Firstly, because it reinforced the image of “the Zulus” as violently addicted to their self-perceived “birth-right” to dominate the political scene, and secondly because the economic consequences (hunger, unemployment, lack of development) of the current devastation would turn the general public against the Zuma faction, also when the latter became so visibly associated with the criminal element exploiting the unrest.

It was therefore to have been expected that the Ramaphosa government would initially have done the bare minimum in terms of a physical assertion of power, in order thereby to achieve important tactical objectives. Above all, so as to avoid falling into the trap of “brutal repression”. Secondly, to obtain first a clear picture and plan properly (there’s no denying that there was a lamentable lack of intelligence, with no logistical capability to speak of and no contingency plans in place). Thirdly, to prioritize protecting long-term essential infrastructure such as water works, and last but not least, to give the other side the rope with which to hang themselves in the arena of public opinion, whilst thereby effectively also obliging the general public to come off the side-lines and range themselves against the violent insurrectionists, to actively take a hand in protecting their own areas and interests.

With his acute understanding of the playbook that the Zuma faction was trying to implement against him, together with his restrained, carefully-considered response (see for example the very clear standing orders regarding disciplined, restrained conduct that were issued to the troops deployed) Pres. Ramaphosa undoubtedly demonstrated great insight, rational restraint and statesmanship under severe pressure.

On the flip side, though, it was essential for government to not appear to have been totally incompetent or so caught up in the paralysis of ANC intra-party unity, to the extent of thereby losing the faith of the public in the government’s ability to effectively govern; to protect them and their interests. In this, the government was perceived by

many to have been less successful. As admitted by the president himself, there were very serious management and organisational problems associated with launching effective counter-action in a timely manner (although evidence will probably start emerging soon of important threats to things such as critical infrastructure, that were successfully averted).

As the immediate impact of the admittedly shocking media images die down, a better public understanding of how serious and complex the challenge to our constitutional order was, may emerge. An understanding for the reality that this was not simply rampant, blind mob violence and criminality allowed by an incompetent government to go un-answered, but in fact an instigated, strategically targeted attempted insurrection aimed at the subversion of our democratic constitutional order, which above all had to be countered with the brain, not first and foremost with the fist. This understanding will likely be aided by the eventual release of the intelligence that the government had to act upon, in relation to priority deployments required to protect vital infrastructure, ahead of rushing to the likes of (already looted and burning) malls and liquor stores. What will NOT help the government's cause, nor its credibility and appearance of competency, is if individual ministers haphazardly persist in putting conflicting messages in the public domain.

It bears repeating that what the Ramaphosa government had to avoid at all costs, in this struggle for the hearts and minds of especially the non-White population, is a perception of brutal overreaction in its use of the security forces (such as Zuma for example had suffered because of the perceptions created by the Marikana incident). Ramaphosa simply could not afford to be equated in any manner with the propaganda image of the "Apartheid-era security forces".

**6. THE SCOREBOARD:** Judging by a number of key pointers, one can safely say that this venture into insurrection was a disaster for the Zuma faction, and that they now know it:

- First there is the incontrovertible fact that the Zuma faction could not succeed in instigating their insurrection in any other parts of the country than where the Zulu demographically dominate.
- Secondly, they could not sustain it, even in KZN and GT, in the face of the steady mobilization of government and communities to counter them.
- Thirdly, Zuma is still very much incarcerated.
- Fourthly, in the minds of the vast majority of the population the Zuma faction has now, even more firmly than ever before, established themselves as "Public Enemy #1".
- Lastly, by the subsequent actions and declarations of the suspected ring-leaders themselves, who are now ducking and diving on a grand scale to try and save their backsides, one can aver that they have lost badly, and very much realise it.

An opinion survey done by the agency Polity, for example, found that 98% of respondents supported the deployment of the SANDF against the insurrectionists, and 94% supported the jailing of Jacob Zuma. In another survey, 92% of

respondents felt that legal action against perceived instigators such as the Zuma children would be justified.

Within the ranks of the justly proud Zulu nation, the consequences of the destruction at economic and health services level in especially the Zulu residential areas (where it will hit by far the hardest), will probably also begin to lead to reflection on whether Zuma should be supported simply because of his blood – the Zulu king and leaders such as Prince Buthelezi are already taking a strong stance in favour of the constitutional order and the need for the "rehabilitation" of the Zulu image after the damage caused it by this shockingly illegal and immoral over-reach instigated by the Zuma clique.



Certainly, this should also bring reflection on whether the propaganda pretence that Zuma was only charged because he was fighting the supposedly manipulative and exploitative WMC, holds any water (the pretence in terms of which one can supposedly therefore "rightfully" steal from those who have, as a radical form of redistribution and also at the same time as just punishment of the evil WMC for their "political manipulation").

The South African public will surely also reflect on whether any of this in the end truly served the interests of the poor — when after this, for a significant period of time, many of them in the affected areas are not going to have food, jobs or health services.

The criminal element that had exploited the turmoil for looting and plundering, is also likely to encounter more active public opposition, as can already be seen from taxi circles and community forums. This may bring greater public engagement to combat crime in the future, and also affect the course of debate/policy around, for example, privately owned firearms.

In assessing why so many Zulu-speaking citizens were willing to participate in the looting and destruction that occurred in KZN and parts of GT, whilst they logically should have known that what they were doing was illegal as well as morally abhorrent, it is essential to look at grinding poverty and the frustration that it nurtures as a plausible root cause (although it cannot be an excuse). It is true that, according to journalists present, very few participants in the looting actually knew very much about Jacob Zuma and his current predicament. Many did not even know who he is. Therefore, in many commentaries, it is stated that the true root cause of the violent looting spree was poverty, linking it back to Apartheid and a perceived lack of progress since.

If frustration born out of grinding poverty indeed was the main driving force behind what happened, then one would need to logically assume that the map of where the unrest occurred, would neatly overlay one of where poverty is at its worst in South Africa. However, the *News24 unrest hotspot map* bears no relation to the latest poverty distribution map below, released in June this year by South Africa Gateway. Gauteng and Durban & Coast, the main unrest hotspots, are actually some of the least poor areas of the country:



The intention here is in no way to deny the urgent need for economic upliftment. That is beyond debate. However, it equally cannot be denied that poverty distribution, in and of itself, cannot explain what actually occurred – the only map with which that of the incidences of violence corresponds, is the map of the demographic distribution of the Zulu population. Not only was Pres. Ramaphosa correct in stating that this was an attempted insurrection. He was also correct in identifying attempted **ethnic mobilization** as being behind it.

An important point to highlight on this scoreboard, is that SASRIA (the national insurance fund compensating for damage arising from political violence, established in 1979) has fortunately been maintained; because of the happy fact that the country has experienced relative peace over the past almost three decades, SASRIA has built up substantial funds to the tune of currently having ZAR8.5 billion under management, which will now be available for reconstruction (other big commercial insurers will of course also be paying out claims from many of those in the formal sector who were affected, and had policies with them, further augmenting the figure available).

Probably the most important score to highlight on this scoreboard, is the sharply increased level of public engagement and awareness. It is evident that the events have profoundly shocked South Africans and had moved many of them to become actively involved in defending their neighbourhoods and interests (albeit because they were perceiving the government to be absent from the battlefield). This engagement will likely be important for the future course of South African politics, especially because in many instances it had cut across racial divides and showed

again the spirit of national unity and positivity that had marked the early years of the Rainbow Nation. In all likelihood, the sickening scenes witnessed will also militate against Africa's scourges of tribalism and xenophobia being allowed to run rampant.

For the younger generation of Whites, these events may also have provided perspective on what their parents had to counter during the conflicts of the seventies and eighties, when it was necessary to balance the need for order and stability (so that life can carry on) with the need for fundamental political change. When the local taxi association or community policing forum last week intervened to stop the wanton destruction, they certainly did not do so because of any wish to be racist. Similarly, the forces of law and order during those turbulent years, now denigrated as the "Apartheid police", had an obligation to the public at large to prevent the type of scenes that we have witnessed last week – scenes that could certainly have occurred then, nation-wide, if the security forces had not set out to maintain a stable environment within which the CODESA negotiations could be conducted, and the New South Africa be born. Now you will understand why NONGQAI's Project Veritas avers with pride that: "*Without the role played by intelligence community and the security forces as midwives, the New South Africa could not have been born.*"

7. CONCLUSION – A DARK CLOUD WITH A SILVER LINING? Looking past the smoke and flames, one of the crucial questions to be answered regarding this crisis, is the political one of whom the majority of the SA population (who are not Zulu, nor part of the criminal underworld) will support? JZ or CR? That seems to have been conclusively answered against the former, with the potential for the latter to maintain and gain support if his government can show its competence by speedy and efficient dedication to the essential re-building. Perhaps more importantly, is to ask WHAT South Africa will support in future, in terms of preferred ideology. Here there is hope, even though it came at a price.

Enormous damage has clearly been done. It surely was a very expensive price to pay, for the insights gained as to what the different factions truly represent. The impact this trauma has made on public perceptions, likely did contribute towards eliminating what certainly is the biggest single threat to the peace and prosperity that all South Africans are entitled to. That threat is undeniably the radical revolutionary approach to gaining and using political power, coupled with the radical economic ideas of the Zuma/NDR/RET faction in the ANC. An ideology that, despite the fall of the Soviet Union and the successfully negotiated constitutional settlement, has persisted in running through like a golden thread animating the ANC's radical faction, from their one-time pursuit of a "*people's republic*", via Lusaka and the Vula clique, to the use of revolutionary tactics to spark the present unrest.

If the NDR/RET idea is unmasked by the current devastation as being recklessly unworkable and is therefore rejected by the majority, then there is also a silver lining to this dark cloud. The unambiguous rejection of Zuma and an NDR/RET, in favour of the Western-style free market system and model constitution that the Kempton Park negotiated settlement has already given us, can then provide a basis for rational economic development policies and also for the wide acceptance of the need for a constitutional state (the *rule of law*). With that settled in the public mind, it

will then be possible to make combating crime and poverty the priority it should be. This can come about, because if these tragic events indeed serve to marginalise the radical wing within the ANC, then their statist ideas (which have stulted economic growth over the past decade) will no longer always have to be paid lip service to by Pres. Ramaphosa's government when it comes to articulating and implementing economic policy and enforcement of the law against the congenitally corrupt.

The current trauma can also again promote true national unity, counter tribalism, and within Zulu ranks bring reflection on how they should temper their participation in politics, so as not to push the other ethnic groups into mistrusting and opposing them.

On the other hand, if the government is perceived to fail in re-establishing order and in upholding the law, and if it does not appear to the public to be effective and expeditious in providing emergency relief and in facilitating the necessary re-building, then both factions of the ANC will stand discredited, so that as a movement it can then soon find itself on the scrapheap of history, very much as indeed happened to the previous (White) governing party...

The silver lining mentioned above can provide a launching platform for growth based on rational policy, stability and harmony – on condition that all South Africans of good will, realise exactly what is at stake and that they therefore come off the sidelines, back into the game...

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